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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of liberty typically presupposes limitations on the
nature of the power that the state exercises over individuals.' Starting
with the notion of a "zone of privacy "2 into which the state may not
1. Perhaps the most renowned work to develop this thesis is JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY
(Marshal Cohen ed., 1961). Mill noted that the "struggle between Liberty and Authority"
remained even after the rise of popular government, because of the possibility of the tyranny of
the majority. Id. at 187. Liberty could only be preserved by respecting the principle that "the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Id. at 197.
Mill's fears were not new. James Madison had similar concerns during the debates over
ratifying the United States Constitution: "It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society
against the injustice of the other part." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 227 (James Madison)
(Charles A. Beard ed., 1948). Originally the Constitution addressed the problem of tyranny by
outlining governmental power, dispersing that power through checks and balances, and noting
a few basic rights, ostensibly leaving the remainder to individual liberty. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 47 (James Madison), No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. The "zone of privacy" is a legal metaphor that arises from several sources. Warren
and Brandeis considered "the right 'to be let alone' " an "inevitable" development of the law.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d. ed. 1888)) (outlining tort
law right to privacy). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), the Supreme Court
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intrude without special justification, liberty traditionally assumes that
the state acts by permitting or forbidding certain individual behavior.'
As Michel Foucault and other theorists have argued, however, such a
conception of state power fails in two respects to capture the true
nature of the state's role in policing its citizens.
First, the state does not simply permit or prohibit certain individ-
ual behavior. Rather, it exercises such pervasive and detailed power
over people that, in a sense, it constitutes who they are.' Second,
announced a similar principle in its construction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: "It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property ....... Id. at 630 (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis apparently
considered the values described in The Right to Privacy to be of constitutional dimension. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting
Boyd). Presently the doctrine of substantive due process manifests the constitutional right of
privacy. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Various guarantees
[among the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
(tracing "a right of personal privacy" back to Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)).
3. The concept of privacy arises from the broader notion of negative liberty, or "the
freedom of the individual to be let alone to do whatever she chooses as long as others are not
harmed." See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1898
n.186 (1987); cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989)
(critiquing privacy, personhood, and Mill's concept of self-regarding acts).
4. By now, we well know the weaknesses in the privacy model. See, e.g., LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-2, at 1305 (2d. ed. 1988) ("[M]eaningful
freedom cannot be protected simply by placing identified realms of thought or spheres of
action beyond the reach of government .... ). In light of the insufficiency of the privacy
model, what is the nature of the individual's relationship to the state?
The French philosopher Michel Foucault envisions a power relation between the state and
the individual which constitutes individuality itself. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 212 (1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, Interview-Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 109 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin
Gordon et al. trans., 1980); Michel Foucault, Afterword-The Subject and Power to HUBERT
L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTICS 208 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter Foucault, Afterword]. For applications of
Foucault in critiques of privacy, see Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 775-82 (evaluating the concept
of personhood); and Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold- Foucauldian and Republican
Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN L. REV. 861 (1991); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1153-58 (1986) (describing
power as the cause of limitations on the potential of autonomous preferences).
5. The pervasive nature of state power stems from the social construction of knowledge.
There is no perceivable objective, determinate meaning of reality; the world as we perceive it
has its meaning constructed from our relationship with others. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics
of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1167-68 (1985). When persons ignore the socially
created character of reality, it becomes "reified," or presumed as true. Id. at 1157. Reification
defines the bounds of consciousness, so that "[w]hat gets called 'knowledge' is the produced
effect of social power institutionalized in social representational conventions." Id. at 1170.
The state's power relation with the individual is an exercise of reification that "applies
itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must
FAMILY AND DEATH
power emanates from a whole range of institutions and discourses
that go beyond the state more narrowly conceived, thereby con-
straining the individual's ability to maintain autonomy.6
The case of Nancy Beth Cruzan and her family portrays both
points about the relationship between the state and the individual.
For years after an automobile accident that left her brain severely
damaged,7 Nancy' and her family became entangled in a web of state
recognize and which others have to recognize in him." Foucault, Afterword, supra note 4, at
212. Power governs by defining an intrinsic course of behavior among an open realm of
possibilities, structuring the way in which individuals behave by limiting their consciousness of
other possible actions. Id. at 221-22. Thus the power relation constitutes, rather than
suppresses, the individual. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 4, at 81-83
(defining power as constitutive rather than repressive).
6. Foucault conceives of power as "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the
sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization." FOUCAULT,
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 4, at 92; see also Foucault, Afterword, supra note 4, at
224, 222-24 ("Power relations are rooted in the system of social networks."). For example, the
use of sexuality as a means of categorization and control arose from medical, educational, and
religious establishments, as well as the family. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra, at
110-11. Under this broad conception of power, Foucault effectively discounts the legitimacy of
the state action distinction in order to "escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which
has captivated political thought for such a long time." Id. at 97.
Foucault's theory of power has troubling implications for the concept of autonomy: if the
individual is socially constituted, what is left of the authentic individual? Some interpret
Foucault to reject autonomy, at least in the conventional sense of self-definition, because the
concept is another form of discourse used to dominate the unwary. See Nancy Fraser, Michel
Foucault: A "Young Conservative"?, 96 ETHICS 165, 177-82 (1985) (considering a possible
reading of Foucault as rejecting autonomy itself as a form of subjection); cf. Rubenfeld, supra
note 3, at 770-82 (finding that "personhood" can be a form of subjection). Foucault himself
implies that autonomy exists socially in some sense, by considering individual resistance and
freedom essential to the power relation: "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only
insofar as they are free." Foucault, Afterword, supra note 4, at 221. Perhaps the rejection of
the discourse of autonomy as self-definition does not preclude autonomy itself. As Professor
Sunstein argues, if we are indeed shaped by society, autonomy must be a matter of degree
rather than absolute and essential, or we are each utterly manipulable by the state. See
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1170.
7. The trooper who first discovered Nancy was dispatched at 12:54 a.m. Believing she
was dead, he did not attempt to revive her. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503). The paramedics, who found Nancy
without detectable respiratory or cardiac functions, began resuscitation efforts at 1:09 a.m.,
and her heartbeat and breathing resumed by 1:12 a.m. 760 S.W.2d at 411. Thus, although no
one could know exact time at which Cruzan's heart stopped delivering oxygen-rich blood to
her brain, estimates are as high as 20 minutes. See Brief of the American Medical Association,
American Academy of Family Physicians, American Association of Neurological Surgeons,
American College of Surgeons, American Medical Women's Association, American Society
for Parenteral & Enteral Nutrition, Missouri State Medical Association, and Missouri State
Neurosurgical Society as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503) [hereinafter Brief of the A.M.A.].
The trial court found that permanent brain damage normally occurs six minutes after the
sustained deprivation of oxygen begins, and the best estimates of Nancy's deprivation ranged
from 12 to 14 minutes. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988). The
neurosurgeon who treated Nancy feared anoxia from the outset. Brief for Petitioners at 6.
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and medical bureaucracy that transformed their lives. Initial
attempts to treat Nancy failed to restore her to consciousness, and
eventually she lapsed into a persistently vegetative state, kept alive
only by a feeding tube implanted in her stomach. 9 Both the hospital
and the State of Missouri refused to remove the tube, over the objec-
tions of her family.
To say, however, that the hospital simply "refused" to permit
exercise of the right to die, or that the State "prohibited" the hospital
and the Cruzan family from removing life-sustaining support, is to
misunderstand the affirmative effects that those exercises of power
had upon the individuals involved. Nancy herself disintegrated into
an unconscious shell of her former self, physically degenerating and
dominated by hospital tubes and treatment. Medical reports indi-
cated Nancy's "incontinence, her alternative constipation and diar-
rhea, her stomach troubles, her eye problems and rashes, her bleeding
gums and obesity, her contorted limbs and her seizures and vomit-
ing."10 In a clear and immediate way, the hospital controlled Nancy's
life. '1
Along with the cerebral contusions which probably resulted from the accident itself, her brain
was permanently damaged from anoxia, the sustained deprivation of oxygen. 110 S. Ct. at
2845.
8. This Comment will refer to Nancy Beth Cruzan as "Nancy." The question of using
first rather than last names implicates, in our society, issues of respect and denigration. On the
one hand, public use of the first name is often seen as degrading to the person to whom such
reference is made; in particular, feminists often see such usage as sexist. See Anna Quindlen,
From Name-Calling to First-Name-Calling (Ask Women), MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 1991, at
15A. On the other hand, feminists have also objected to the "hierarchy, rigidity, and
depersonalization" implicit in the exclusive use of last names in a public context. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 829 n.* (1990) ("First
names have been one dignified way in which women could distinguish themselves from their
fathers and their husbands."). This Comment will refer to Nancy Beth Cruzan by her first
name in the spirit of the latter critique, and also to drive home the very direct and personal
impact that the exercise of state power had on her.
9. A persistently vegetative patient is entirely and irrecoverably unconscious of her
surroundings, despite some involuntary movements. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845. Patients in a
persistently vegetative state manifest reflex actions, and their eyes move, though not in any
purposeful manner. Brief of the A.M.A., supra note 7, at 8.
10. Andrew H. Malcolm, Missouri Family Renews Battle Over Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1990, at A4 (describing medical reports used by the court-appointed guardian at
Cruzan's rehearing following the Supreme Court's ruling).
11. Professor Jed Rubenfeld aptly described the hospital's utter control of the vegetative
patient's existence:
For right-to-die patients, being forced to live is in fact to be forced into a
particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and indeed rigidly standardized life:
the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and
tended to by medical professionals. It is a life almost totally occupied. The
person's body is, moreover, so far expropriated from his own will, supposing that
he seeks to die, that the most elemental acts of his existence-such as breathing,
digesting, and circulating blood-are forced upon him by an external agency.
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Similarly, the lives of Nancy's loved ones were transformed, vir-
tually into a continual wake. The Cruzan family had to travel forty-
five miles to the hospital daily to care for Nancy. 12 They fed her and
laced up her shoes to prevent limb contraction.' 3  They prayed for
her, begged her to blink, talked to her about her favorite nieces,
brushed her hair, touched her, bought her dolls and presents, set up a
Christmas tree in the hospital in 1983, and brought her home for
three days over Christmas in 1984.14 But in the end, all of the fam-
ily's struggling with Nancy's new life could not bring her back again.
As one of Nancy's sisters said: "After all this time seeing her so con-
torted, it's hard to remember Nancy laughing.... It's so hard to have
all the good memories overshadowed by the image of her now. I'll be
glad when we can concentrate on those memories and not her physi-
cal existence."' 5
The experience of the Cruzan family teaches us that the power of
the state does not merely direct or prohibit, but has the capacity virtu-
ally to commandeer people's lives. Equally important, that constitu-
tive power does not emanate solely from the state government, but
encompasses a wide range of state and private institutions. In the
Cruzans' case, Nancy's family confronted a medical bureaucracy with
resources and knowledge so superior to their own that they were pow-
erless to voice their own wishes even when the hospital ostensibly con-
sulted them.' 6  The hospital's power became even more apparent
Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 795; see also infra text accompanying notes 73-81 (further describ-
ing Nancy Cruzan's medically dominated existence).
12. Brief for Petitioners at 8, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (No. 88-1503). Notably, Nancy had been married for about a year prior to the
accident. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 432 (Mo. 1988) (Higgins, J., dissenting). A few
months after her accident, Nancy's husband left her at his grandmother's home, where she had
professional nursing care. Id. at 431. Nancy's parents became her court-appointed guardians
and conservators a little over a year after the accident. Id. Her husband failed to attend the
guardianship proceedings, and the court decreed a dissolution of marriage. Id.
13. Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, Cruzan (No. 88-1503).
14. Id. at 8.
15. Andrew H. Malcolm, Case Testing Right to Die 'Aged Us All,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1990, at L24. The possibility that Nancy somehow knew what was happening to her also
disturbed the Cruzans. Although a persistently vegetative person is incapable of
consciousness, the person's involuntary muscle activity can give a contrary impression. Brief
of the A.M.A., supra note 7, at 8. The nursing staff believed that Nancy was more responsive
to some persons than to others, would react to conversation, and cried after a Valentine's Day
card was read to her and after her family visited. Brief for Respondents Harmon and Lamkins
at 3, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503). The
family believed that, if indeed she were conscious of her treatment, "Nancy would be
horrified." Brief for Petitioners at 8, Cruzan (No. 88-1503).
16. At the time the doctors sought and received the Cruzan family's permission to implant
the tube, they said that Nancy's prognosis was uncertain, and they still hoped that she would
recover. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Cruzan (No. 88-1503).
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when it refused to terminate the feeding at the family's request.' 7
From that point on, the Cruzans grappled with the state, which
asserted an independent interest in maintaining Nancy's life, apart
from her own wishes or those of the family. Their struggle, though
necessitated by the potentially transformative nature of power, never-
theless testifies to the fact that such power is not irresistible.'I
It was this intrusive, nearly pervasive form of power that the
Supreme Court failed to understand when it confronted the case.
Instead of taking the family's role in the litigation into account, the
Court required "clear and convincing" proof that Nancy would want
to end such treatment. '9 Thus, in a state like Missouri a family could
not exercise the right to terminate treatment on behalf of an incompe-
tent patient by showing that the patient would want the treatment to
end, or that the patient expressed such a desire while competent.2°
Even more disturbing was the Court's approval of the Missouri "sanc-
tity of life" policy, which identified a state interest in the patient's life,
independent of the patient's own interests and quality of life.2' Such
an interest virtually endorsed the kind of intrusive, transformative
17. Concerned with potential legal liability, the hospital told the Cruzans it could not
honor their request to terminate treatment without a court order. Id. at 8. The trial judge
described the medical institution's chief concern as "the legal consequences of such actions
rather than any objections that good ethical standards of the profession would be breached."
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 433 (Mo. 1988).
18. The Cruzan family's struggle reflects their resistance to the state's power. See supra
note 6 (discussing the importance of resistance for autonomy).
19. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853, 2855-56 (1990).
20. The quantum and quality of evidence that satisfies the "clear and convincing"
standard is unknown. Practically, the ruling implied that a state may condition the right to die
upon the preparation of a "living will," the patient's directions for treatment written in
advance of incompetency. See id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the
Constitution may require the state to effectuate a patient's advance directives); see also H.
REP. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1990) (describing Cruzan as "a case in which the
Court recognized a patient's right to die and endorsed the withdrawal of life support and
withholding of medical treatment in cases where a patient's wishes were known"), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2100. A living will statute allows "a competent person to decree in a
formal document that she would refuse death prolonging medical treatment in the event of
terminal illness and an accompanying inability to refuse such treatment as a result of
incompetency." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988).
Unfortunately, living wills, like conventional wills, do not guarantee that the patient's
wishes will be complied with in all circumstances. Inevitably some patients will neglect to
prepare the necessary documents, and the terms of many living will statutes exclude pregnant
women. Linda C. Fentimann, Privacy and Personhood Revisited: A New Framework for
Substitute Decisionmaking for the Incompetent, Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
801, 818-22 (1989) (surveying living will statutes). Recently, however, Congress has promoted
awareness of advance directives by requiring medicare providers and federally funded state
medical programs to provide patients with written notice of their rights to refuse treatment.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104
Stat. 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206.
21. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:149
FAMILY AND DEATH
power of the state that tormented the Cruzans for years."
The four dissenting justices displayed a somewhat greater sensi-
tivity to the human tragedy surrounding the case. Yet in advocating a
model of simple deference to a private sphere, they too failed to
address the affirmative and pervasive effects of power. Justice Bren-
nan urged substituted decisionmaking by the family to be exercised on
behalf of the incompetent patient and according to her preferences.23
Justice Stevens advocated a "best interests" approach, giving the
court the primary power to decide what would be best for the patient,
while still taking into account the values of the family and patient.24
Assuming that in both cases the justices' goal is to honor the patient's
preferences, both approaches have inherent weaknesses.2" Substituted
judgment risks displacing the patient's desires with those of the surro-
gate decisionmaker, because no surrogate can make such a decision
without somehow incorporating her own values.26 Best interests deci-
22. The Cruzan family began its court battle when it sued for declaratory relief in the fall
of 1987. Brief for Petitioners at 9, Cruzan (No. 88-1503). After the Supreme Court handed
down its decision on June 25, 1990, the Cruzans returned to court for a new trial to argue that
they had clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes. Malcolm, supra note 10. The
family produced three friends who remembered specific conversations in which Nancy said she
would not want to live like a vegetable. Malcolm, supra note 15. The Attorney General of the
State of Missouri dropped the case, because its purpose in pursuing the matter was merely to
clarify Missouri's law about the removal of life support, and not to challenge the particular
removal of Nancy's tube. Lisa Belkin, Missouri Seeks to Quit Case of Comatose Patient, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A15. Now essentially unchallenged, the family's suit was successful.
On December 26, 1990, twelve days after the hospital removed her feeding tube, Nancy
Cruzan died. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al.
23. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text. Designating Justice Stevens' approach
as "best interests" and Justice Brennan's as "substituted judgment" may mask the complexity
of the different decisionmaking methods. As the majority opinion in Cruzan indicates, the
state courts have generated diverse decisionmaking methods. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847-50 (1990) (surveying state court analytical methods and
their legal foundations); see also Steven M. Richards, Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The
Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a
Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394 (1989) (surveying treatment
decisionmaking methods). Although they may differ in their practical application, their
methodological differences stem from the range of objectivity that the court will use.
Substituted judgment, which asks what the patient would choose if she could, tends to be
subjective; best interests, which asks if a reasonable person would consider the treatment to be
inhumane, tends to be objective. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1988)
(outlining "subjective," "limited-objective," and "pure-objective" standards to be used,
depending on the amount of evidence available about the patient's wishes); see also Nancy K.
Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 375-78 (1988) (critiquing the
subjective and objective standards). Although the methods espoused by Justice Stevens and
Justice Brennan may differ from the finer points of the states' various methods, they fairly
reflect the "objective" and "subjective" paradigms.
25. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 15-11, at 1369-70.
26. Id. at 1369-71 (referring to the exercise of substituted judgment as reaching "almost
1991]
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sionmaking risks being paternalistic and denying the patient's values
entirely."
The majority and dissent also failed to understand that, given the
inevitably pervasive, constitutive nature of power, a case like Cruzan
is bound to result in a struggle for control. The state, the hospital,
and the patient's loved ones inevitably find themselves in a battle over
the fate of the incompetent patient. When the court defers to the fam-
ily, it necessarily empowers a select group of individuals, typically
those related to the patient by kinship or marriage.28 Others are
excluded, even though they may be more emotionally connected to
the patient than the members of the patient's family. There is no rea-
son, however, for kinship or marriage to empower a class of deci-
sionmakers, beyond the intuitive probability that those related by
kinship or marriage are in fact emotionally attached to the patient.
Nor is there any reason for the court to define death, as the majority
in Cruzan does, as a purely biological event. By adopting such a view,
the majority subordinates the patient's loved ones to the hospital. A
more humane approach would be to require the medical establish-
ment to defer to the patient or the patient's loved ones, and allow
them to be the ones to define death.
This Comment examines treatment decisionmaking for persist-
ently vegetative patients like Nancy Cruzan, who are, and will be,
unconscious until death. Such a form of existence is arguably "life,"
but only in the technical, medical sense.29 Consequently, the interest
of the patient's family in allowing the patient to "die with dignity"3 0
should be accorded at least as much weight as the interests of the state
or medical establishment in preserving the patient's life. Under this
Alice in Wonderland proportions"); see also James Bopp & Daniel Avila, The Siren's Lure of
Invented Consent: A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decisionmaking for Legally-
Incapacitated Older Persons, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 779, 780 (1991) (asserting that substituted
judgment unjustifiably invents the consent of the incapacitated patient); Louise Harmon,
Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1
(1990) (outlining the history of substituted judgment and criticizing its unexamined use);
Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 933 (1985) (criticizing use of substituted judgment rationale for decisions about infants).
A recent survey indicated that there is a substantial probability that family members will
incorrectly predict the life-and-death decisions of their loved ones, and physicians' predictions
are no better than chance. Alison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are
Proxy Predictions?, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 95 (1991).
27. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 15-11, at 1369-71; see also infra notes 119-23 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's approach).
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
30. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985) ("[P]atients and their families are
increasingly asserting a right to die a natural death without undue dependence on medical
technology or unnecessarily protracted agony-in short, a right to 'die with dignity.' ").
[Vol. 46:149
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analysis, the question of who the patient's "family" should be for pur-
poses of making treatment decisions-and what their role should be
in the patient's death -resolves the issue of whether the patient's life
is worth living.
Part II uses a critique of Cruzan to introduce the power relation
governing the death of persistently vegetative patients. The majority's
holding fails to protect the patient; instead, it supersedes the patient's
values in order to support Missouri's sanctity-of-life ideology. The
dissenting opinions, while more protective of the patient's liberty and
the family's emotions, misjudge the interrelatedness of the family and
the state and thereby miss the importance of examining where and
how the Court distributes authority. Part III examines state empow-
erment of the patient's relatives and proposes an alternative, norma-
tive method of distributing control based upon mutual emotional
attachment, similar to the method used by the New York Court of
Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Associates."1 Part IV examines the effect
of the medical establishment's control of the patient, which deepens
the family's sense of grief and helplessness. This Comment concludes
that, to the extent possible, we should reconceive death itself in order
to return control to the patient and her loved ones.
II. ANALYSIS OF CRUZAN
A. Historical and Doctrinal Background
In the fall of 1987, after the hospital administration refused to
act without judicial authorization, the Cruzan family sought and
obtained a declaratory judgment from a state trial court to authorize
the removal of Nancy's gastrointestinal tube.32 By a four-to-three
31. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
32. Brief for Petitioners at 9, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (No. 88-1503). During the time that Nancy was incapacitated, no family member ever
witnessed a response from her. Id. at 8. By the time the Cruzans filed their petition for
declaratory judgment, the statistical possibility of Nancy recovering consciousness was
essentially nil. Of an estimated 100,000 patients suffering from her condition, only three
recoveries have been reported, and the latest recovery occurred 22 months after the illness
began. Brief of the A.M.A., supra note 7, at 11-12. Based upon Nancy's remarks to a
housemate and her sister, as well as their own intuition, Nancy's mother, father and sisters
believed that she would not want to endure in a vegetative condition. While discussing the
death of a housemate's relative, Nancy Cruzan told the housemate that she would not want to
live as a "vegetable." Brief for Petitioners at 5, Cruzan (No. 88-1503). Nancy twice discussed
her beliefs with one of her sisters, a year and a half before the accident, following the death of
their grandmother and the stillborn birth of their younger sister's baby. Id. at 6. The family's
convictions were supported by a holistic understanding of Nancy based upon the closeness of
their relationship. For instance, Nancy's mother "as her mother" knew that "Nancy would
not want to be like she is now." Id. at 8.
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vote, however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed.3 The court
held that the state's interest in life prohibits the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from an incompetent patient in a persistently
vegetative state unless clear and convincing evidence shows that the
patient would have wanted the withdrawal.34 Missouri's "living will"
statute35 expressed the state's "sanctity of life" position-a state inter-
est in life independent of the patient's interests and the quality of her
life. 36 The court considered Nancy's informal statements to her fam-
ily and friends to be "woefully inadequate" as evidence of her refusal
of treatment.37 Balancing such "inherently unreliable" expressions of
Nancy's beliefs against the state's interests in preserving human life
and furthering the sanctity of life policy, the court held that Nancy's
parents did not have authority to withdraw her hydration and
nutrition.38
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court sustained Mis-
33. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, Higgins, and Welliver, JJ.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 424, 426.
35. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1986). The Missouri living will statute is based
upon the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, but with "substantial modifications."
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988). The modifications deny refusal of "the
administration of medication or the performance of medical procedure deemed necessary to
provide comfort care or to alleviate pain" or "the performance of any procedure to provide
nutrition or hydration." Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986). The modifications are so
extensive one dissenting justice stated that the statute is "a fraud on Missourians who believe
we have been given a right to execute a living will, and to die naturally, respectably, and in
peace." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 442 (Welliver, J., dissenting). The Missouri living
will statute was held not to apply to the case, since the law took effect after Nancy Cruzan's
accident, and she had never executed a living will. Id. at 420.
36. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
37. Id. at 424 (quoting In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 957 (Me. 987) (Clifford, J.,
dissenting)). The court questioned an individual's ability to make an informed decision about
medical treatment while not actually faced with suffering a debilitating injury or disease. Id. at
416-17. The question whether a person can ever adequately foresee what her values will be
following a radical change in the manner of her existence has sweeping implications for the
efficacy of both living wills and substituted judgment. See infra notes 276-89 and
accompanying text.
38. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426-27. The Missouri Supreme Court noted four state interests
in refusal of life-sustaining treatment: "preservation of life, prevention of homicide and suicide,
the protection of interests of innocent third parties and the maintenance of the ethical integrity
of the medical profession." Id. at 419 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 497.055(1) (1986) and Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986)). The Missouri Court
added the interest in prevention of homicide; the other interests, derived from cases of a
patient's refusal of non-vital treatment, were first announced in Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977). In similar cases, courts routinely
state the four state interests, though normally no more than one or two apply. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (quoting Saikewicz). The Missouri
Supreme Court found that only the preservation of life was at issue in Cruzan. Cruzan, 760
S.W.2d at 419.
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souri's approach, holding that a state may impose a clear-and-con-
vincing burden of proof in proceedings where a guardian seeks to
discontinue life-supporting treatment of a persistently vegetative per-
son. 39 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that the state has an independent, unqualified interest in human life,
as well as an interest in protecting a patient from potential abuses by
her family and other risks of an erroneous decision to withdraw life
support.'" Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence stressed that the
patient's liberty interests encompassed the right to delegate the choice
to a decisionmaker, if adequate procedural safeguards are met.41 Also
concurring, Justice Scalia asserted that there is no constitutional right
to the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment.42
Four justices dissented. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Blackmun, argued that freedom from unwanted medical
treatment-even life-sustaining treatment-is a fundamental right
that outweighs a state's general interest in life.43 Where the patient is
incompetent, Brennan proposed that the family exercise substituted
judgment on behalf of the patient, subject to oversight by the court to
prevent abuses." Justice Stevens' dissent asserted that, by imposing
its definition of life on Cruzan without regard to her beliefs, the state
had failed "to care for Nancy Cruzan's life in a way that gives appro-
priate respect to her own best interests."45 Although a state could use
a clear and convincing standard of proof, it should only employ that
standard to discern the patient's best interests, not to assert a policy
respecting the sanctity of life without regard to its quality.46
B. Critique of the Majority
The Court's analysis of the constitutional issues involved is defi-
39. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990).
40. Id. at 2852-53. The Court rejected the Cruzans' argument that close family members
should be able to decide for an incompetent patient even if they could not clearly prove that
their views reflected those of the patient. Id. at 2855. The Cruzans relied on Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), which upheld the statutory protection of traditional family
relationships, and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), which upheld parental decisionmaking
for mentally ill minors. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855; see also infra notes 173-80 and
accompanying text (discussing Michael H. v. Gerald D.). The Court distinguished the cases,
reasoning that in Michael H. and Parham the Court upheld the states' power to prescribe
individual rights, rather than individual rights themselves. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
41. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 2859-63 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I assert only that the Constitution has nothing
to say about the subject.").
43. Id. at 2870.
44. Id. at 2877.
45. Id. at 2879, 2885-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2889-90.
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cient in two respects. First, it ignored the substantive effects of Mis-
souri's rule on the burden of proof. The heightened evidentiary
burden required by the clear and convincing standard protects per-
sonal choice only if one assumes that the patient would want to
remain on life support. But that assumption begs the question
whether in fact the patient would want life support continued even
when she is persistently vegetative.47 The appointment of a guardian
ad litem could better address the Court's fear that the family might
act selfishly.
The second defect in the majority's analysis is its approval of
Missouri's unqualified, independent state interest in the preservation
of life, an interest that has ominous implications for both individual
patients and health care providers. By refusing to consider personal
choices about the quality of life, the assertion of an unqualified state
interest in the sanctity of life position jeopardizes individual auton-
omy. The state's unqualified interest promotes the support of life
without regard to the beliefs that the patient may hold about the qual-
ity of life and the risk of death.
1. RESPECTING THE PATIENT'S WISHES
The Supreme Court approved the clear and convincing standard
based on the state's interest in respecting the patient's wishes concern-
ing life support. When the patient is in a vegetative state, the right to
refuse life support "must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of
surrogate. ' 4 The task of the trial court is "to assure that the action
of the surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by
the patient while competent. ' 49 The best way to accomplish this,
according to the Missouri Supreme Court, was to require the surro-
gate to back up a claim that the patient would want life support to be
withdrawn by clear and convincing evidence.
The Supreme Court's analysis failed to consider Missouri's par-
ticularly stringent interpretation of informed consent. The common
law doctrine of informed consent requires a voluntary decision by a
competent patient with a clear understanding of the risks and benefits
of the proposed treatment.5 0 As interpreted by the Missouri Supreme
Court, however, "informed consent" is virtually impossible to prove
in a case like Cruzan's, because any remarks a person might make
47. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985) ("To err either way-to keep
a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather have been allowed to die, or
to allow the person to die when he would have chosen life-would be deeply unfortunate.").
48. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
49. Id.
50. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
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about treatment she would desire once she lapsed into a persistently
vegetative state would be hypothetical. In holding that "it is defini-
tionally impossible for a person to make an informed decision--either
to consent or to refuse-under hypothetical circumstances,"51 the
Missouri court places the patient in an impossible situation. Even if
the patient clearly expressed her desires while competent, her wishes
would reflect no understanding of her existence as an incompetent
person.
The Missouri court's analysis does have the merit of recognizing
the complexity of a seemingly obvious question: "What would the
patient want?" Personhood is dynamic, changing through time to
such an extent that an individual might be seen as becoming a differ-
ent person when she faces the life-support decision.52 One might won-
der, for example, whether the remarks of a twenty year-old person
about life-sustaining treatment could accurately capture her feelings
about life and death fifty years later. In fact, the extraordinary experi-
ence of becoming incompetent could itself effectively generate a "new
person" with radically different preferences.53 Yet, carried to its logi-
cal conclusion, this analysis undercuts the very idea of respecting the
incompetent's wishes. Instead of honoring the hypothetical-and
unreliable-expressions of the formerly competent individual's
wishes, the court would have to examine the patient's desires as those
of a new person, transformed in ways that the individual might have
foreseen but could not have understood.54 The court would have to
ask what the patient would want now, in her new incarnation as an
incompetent, rather than ask what she imagined she would want
while she was competent. It is unclear what could guide the court.
As a new person, her old values would give inadequate guidance, yet
as an incompetent, she could not communicate her new values. 55
The Missouri court's approach helps little if understood to rest
upon individual assertions of personhood. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court understood the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard as a mechanism for respecting the desires the patient expressed
51. Id.
52. See Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 379 (1986).
53. Id. at 381.
54. Id. at 390.
55. Id. at 390-91 (advocating behavioral and physiological studies to understand the
nature of an incompetent patient's existence). Such an approach risks interpreting the
patient's expressions, in whatever form they are made, through our own understanding of what
existence is and should be. Just as the patient herself could not realize the nature of
incompetence, we ourselves cannot.
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while competent, to "safeguard the personal element of ... choice," 56
However, the evidentiary standard is a poor mechanism to effectuate
that aim. It interferes with respect for individual choice and imposes
the state's choice by default. The ostensible purpose of the heightened
evidentiary burden is to shift the risk of an incorrect decision to par-
ties who bring disfavored claims." Yet "maintenance of the status
quo"58 is as harmful to a patient who would like to refuse medical
treatment as terminating life-support is to a patient who wishes to
persist.59 If the Court allows the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment only when clear and convincing evidence reveals what the
patient would want, then inevitably there will be cases where an
incompetent patient would want treatment withdrawn but continues
to receive treatment because the evidentiary standard was not met.
Such a result forces the patient to remain in a persistently vegetative
state and distorts her image in the eyes of her loved ones.6° More
important, the Court's analysis presumes that, absent a clear prior
directive, the incompetent patient would want to remain vegetative
until her organs failed.61 As this presumption is relaxed, the stan-
dard's potential for reaching the incorrect outcome-supporting the
patient against the patient's wishes-increases proportionately. Thus,
the Court mistakenly analyzes the risk of error in decisionmaking;
"maintenance of the status quo" often means continuing the injury to
the very liberty interest that the Court has recognized.62
Finally, the clear and convincing standard cannot be justified as
necessary to "guard against potential abuses." 63  The Court feared
that the patient's family would not always act in the patient's best
interests." As is typical, the Court reviewed the case as though the
56. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
57. Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2854.
59. See id. at 2873 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("An erroneous decision to terminate artificial
nutrition and hydration, to be sure, will lead to failure of that last remnant of physiological
life, the brain stem, and result in complete brain death. An erroneous decision not to
terminate life-support, however, robs the patient of the very qualities protected by the right to
avoid unwanted medical treatment.").
60. See id. at 2873, 2873-74 (Brennan, J. Dissenting) (arguing that improved medical
techniques will factor into the analysis when they arise).
61. See id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority "assumes either that
the State's policy is consistent with Nancy Cruzan's own interests, or that no damage is done
by ignoring her interests.").
62. See id. at 2854.
63. Id. at 2853.
64. Id. at 2853 ("And even where family members are present, '[t]here will, of course, be
some unfortunate situations in which family members will not act to protect a patient.')
(citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 477 (N.J. 1987)).
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family might be ill-intentioned,65 although the facts indicated other-
wise. If indeed such abuse really occurred, the court-appointed
guardians ad litem would assist in addressing it.66 The Supreme
Court found that the guardians ad litem did not act "the least bit
improperly" by believing that Nancy's interests coincided with the
judgment of the family.67 Nevertheless, the Court believed that, even
with a good-faith guardian, the adversarial process might fail in such
cases.68  The adversarial process may be an awkward method of
uncovering the patient's desires, but a heightened evidentiary burden
is a faulty means of adjusting it. Such a burden only increases the
difficulty of uncovering the patient's desires, not adversity between the
participants.
2. THE STATE'S UNQUALIFIED, INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN LIFE
The Supreme Court held that Missouri could maintain an inter-
est in prolonging an individual patient's life, less regard of its quality:
"[W]e think a State may properly decline to make judgments about
the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individ-
ual."69 That interest, the Court ruled, allows a state to deny termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment absent clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's desire.
This interest in the "sanctity of life" 70 addresses the danger that
the state will define a person "by what the individual can do or feel,
rather than by reference to their nature: that is, what they are."'"
Sanctity of life advocates claim that by redefining a person's rights
65. The Court notes that "[n]o doubt is engendered by anything in this record but that
Nancy Cruzan's mother and father are loving and caring parents." Id. at 2855. Several other
courts have expressed similar fears, though their fears also did not arise from the facts
themselves. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987) (anticipating "unfortunate
circumstances in which family members will not act to protect a patient" will be exceptional).
66. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2872 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the efficacy of a
guardian ad litem).
67. Id. at 2853 n.9. The guardians ad litem appealed the case to the Missouri Supreme
Court, despite feeling that Cruzan's desires matched those of the family. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2853 (emphasis added).
70. The term "sanctity of life" was used in the Missouri Supreme Court. See Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W. 408, 419 (Mo. 1988). For an earlier review of the sanctity-of-life principle
in light of modem bioethical issues, see Daniel Callahan, The Sanctity of Life, in UPDATING
LIFE AND DEATH 181 (Donald R. Cutler ed., 1968).
71. Robert A. Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise
of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. PuB. POL. 72, 97 (1986).
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according to a judgment of what an individual's quality of life should
be, the law might well cease to protect a class of the "manifestly
unfit."'7 2  In this view, any willingness to consider a vegetative
patient's quality of life is the first step toward the complete abrogation
of individual rights.
7 3
Although the concern for the sanctity of life is legitimate, when
taken to an extreme, as it was in Cruzan, it leads to dangerous results.
Two considerations conflict with the declaration that all life is sacred
without regard to the quality of that life. First, such a policy ignores
the individual values that give meaning to each person's existence.
Indeed, for the state to tell a person that she must live despite her
inability to see, hear, taste, smell, feel, or think may desecrate her
conception of life as well as her family's. Second, an attempt to
implement a policy that favors preserving life without qualification
would impose absurd burdens on medical resources. Ultimately, the
limitation of those resources itself imposes qualifications on the pres-
ervation of life.
The sanctity of life approach fails to recognize the values people
place on the full range of human experience. Life for most of us
means thinking, feeling, touching, and communicating. 74 "Life" for
the persistently vegetative patient is profoundly different. The term
vegetative state denotes "unconsciousness with persistent brain-stem
functions that maintain subsistence functions and often wakeful-
ness.'"75 Although organs operate, "[p]ersonality, memory, purposive
action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even emotional
states are gone."'76 "Life" for Nancy Beth Cruzan meant atrophying
muscles, contracting arms and legs, and fingernails cutting into her
wrists. 77  "Eating" meant having a gastronomy tube surgically
72. Destro traces the evolution of quality of life decisionmaking from Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), through Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 203 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
(permitting sterilization of a retarded woman and noting that "[i]t is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind"),
and ultimately Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Destro, supra note 70, at 99-115.
73. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 313 (Ill. 1989) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(discussing attitudes toward nonrehabilitative persons leading to World War II atrocities); see
also Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation,
42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1030-41 (1958) (criticizing euthanasia as the first step towards the
"parade of horrors").
74. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Life, particularly human life,
is not commonly thought of as a mere physiological condition or function.").
75. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 174 n.9 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT].
76. Id. at 174-75.
77. Brief of the A.M.A., supra note 7, at 5.
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implanted into her stomach so that nutritional formula could be
pumped directly into her gastrointestinal tract.7" "Medical care"
meant blood testing and regular monitoring of her weight and fluids
to prevent the problems that gastrointestinal tubes can create-the
obstruction of the intestinal tract, erosion and piercing of the stomach
wall, leakage into the abdominal cavity, and other gastrointestinal
problems.79 "Daily routine" for Nancy Beth Cruzan meant frequent
turning and padding to prevent skin sores,80 and the application of
wet-to-dry dressings or sharp dissection to clear cellular debris, pre-
vent infection, and control any lesions that arose.8 ' Nancy Beth
Cruzan, herself completely unconscious of her state, potentially could
have persisted this way for thirty years.8 2
In short, the Court's disdain for evaluating the quality of lite
ignores the reality that life is a range of qualities.8 3 Modern medicine
has shown that life encompasses a spectrum of existence, from the
vivacious to the comatose, 84 vegetative, 5 brain dead, 6 and circulation
dead. 7 The definition of life must be updated to include those forms
of life created by medical technology. 8 By keeping the definition con-
stant while medical technology redefines the quality of life, courts
deny protection to the newly created class of those who are techni-
cally alive but are incapable of higher consciousness or social
interaction.89
The moral and theological status of the persistently vegetative
person ultimately turns upon one's personal philosophy or theology.
78. Id.
79. Other potential problems were vomiting, diarrhea, and pneumonia from reflux of the
stomach's contents into the lung. Id. at 14-15.
80. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 291.
81. Id.
82. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 n.l (1990).
83. See Robert S. Morison, Death: Process or Event?, in DEATH INSIDE OUT 63, 66 (Peter
Steinfels & Robert M. Veatch eds., 1975) (describing death as "part of a continuous process
that is coextensive (almost) with living").
84. The term "coma" is used imprecisely, but generally refers to a state of impaired
consciousness. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 174 n.9.
85. See supra note 9.
86. "Brain death" refers to the permanent loss of all brain functions. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 22-24 (1981) [hereinafter DEFINING DEATH].
87. "Circulation death" refers to the cessation of the flow of bodily fluids. Id. at 41.
88. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2883-87 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (discussing definition of life and death in the wake of advanced medical
technology).
89. See PHILIPPE ARIES, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH 583-88 (1981) (discussing
"medicalization" of death arising from technological advancements that allow the medical
establishment control over the duration of death though it is unable to restore health).
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By some persons' conceptions of life and death, Nancy Cruzan was
dead, despite the medical community's definition of life.' Yet the
state successfully asserted a right to keep Nancy's organs functioning,
even if it meant disrespecting her wishes. This outcome is especially
ironic in light of Missouri's purported "interest in the sanctity of life
itself."91 The term "sanctity" suggests that the value of life lies pre-
cisely in the moral and spiritual values that Missouri overrode, and
not in the mere fact of physical functioning. 92 Yet the Court's deci-
sion essentially ignores Nancy's beliefs and imposes those of the
state.
93
Moreover, the implications of an unqualified state interest in the
preservation of life are enormous. Read broadly, the majority opinion
allows the state to defy even a competent patient's decision to refuse
life-sustaining treatment. 94 The state could impose life-saving treat-
ment against the patient's own wishes, if it was in her presumed "best
interests." '9 Considering the unqualified, independent state interest in
90. See, e.g., Brief of the General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist
Church as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503) ("First, life should not be assessed in purely
medical terms. Life and health, as amicus understands them, are an integration of the
spiritual, emotional, and physical aspects of being."); see also Jeff McMahan, Death and the
Value of Life, 99 ETHICS 32, 54-56 (1988) (life's value stems from experience and psychological
connectedness to an identity).
91. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (emphasis added).
92. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2886-87 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Life, particularly human life, is not commonly thought of as merely a
physiological condition or function. Its sanctity is thought to derive from the impossibility of
any such reduction.").
93. Despite the centrality of afterlife to religious devotion, claims of freedom of religion in
this context have been ignored since they were rejected in In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661-
662 (N.J.) (noting that in free exercise of religion analysis "[t]he public interest is . ..
considered paramount without essential dissolution of respect for religious beliefs"), cert.
denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). However, the courts often
consider religious beliefs when evaluating the patient's presumed desires in the right to die
analysis. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985) (citing Storar and noting
expression of intent could be derived from religious views); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72
(N.Y. 1981) (finding Brother Fox's expressed desire not to have medical treatment "is
supported by his religious beliefs and is not inconsistent with his life of unselfish religious
devotion"); see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2885 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
afterlife).
94. The majority opinion noted a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the refusal of
medical treatment generally, but questioned its application in the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
95. Prior caselaw indicates that a state can force medical treatment upon a patient when
the decision to refuse treatment seems non-autonomous. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 15-11, at
1363 (noting cases in which parents refuse treatment to children for religious reasons, or the
patient was mentally ill). But a competent patient's contemplated decision to refuse treatment
is another matter; in such a situation, the courts seem more willing to allow refusal of
treatment, despite the resulting death of the patient. Id.; see also, e.g., Bartling v. Superior
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life, the state could conceivably intervene to support life even against
the patient's expressed wishes; or the state could forbid a patient from
undergoing dangerous surgery that would not lengthen life and might
result in death, but, if successful, would vastly increase the individ-
ual's quality of life.96
An unqualified interest in the preservation of life would also call
into question the practice of refraining from resuscitating certain
patients. Hospitals began formulating policies not to resuscitate cer-
tain patients following "the recognition by professional organizations
that non-resuscitation was appropriate when well-being would not be
served by an attempt to reverse cardiac arrest." 97 Doctors implement
"No Code" or "Do Not Resuscitate" ("DNR") orders after consult-
ing competent patients or the families of incompetent patients. 9 The
courts have supported such policies.99 The primary consideration in
deciding not to resuscitate is the patient's medical condition, evalu-
ated by the likelihood of the "restoration of health or satisfactory
function"-an evaluation that apparently examines the patient's qual-
ity of life.1°° In states that declare an unqualified interest in life, a
doctor could be negligently or indeed intentionally homicidal in
ordering non-resuscitation.' 0 ' By its very terms, an unqualified inter-
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing non-terminally ill, competent person
to refuse life-sustaining treatment); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (same).
96. See DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 73. Consider a persistently
vegetative patient who will die soon without some additional treatment. One hypothetical
procedure will potentially increase the patient's lifespan for thirty years, with a ten percent
chance of immediate death during the operation. Presumably the state would permit such a
procedure, which by quantitative analysis essentially adds twenty-seven years of life.
However, using the state's concept of life itself as an absolute good, the same outcome is
reached where the procedure is ninety-nine percent likely to fail, and life will only be
prolonged for a month, or even a day-the unqualified interest in life implies an unqualified
desire to preserve it. See 110 S. Ct. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing adverse
consequences of policy of using "heroic measures if there is a scintilla of a chance that the
patient will recover").
97. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 236.
98. Id. at 494-500 (outlining resuscitation policies of the Bar Association of San Francisco
Medical Society, Medical Society of the State of New York, Medical Association of the State
of Alabama, and the Minnesota Medical Association).
99. The Quinlan court implied that the use of a DNR order would be protected as a
"medical decision." In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Arizona Supreme Court, faced with the issue directly,
permitted the use of the order. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (supporting
DNR order for persistently vegetative nursing home patient). See also In re Dinnerstein, 380
N.E. 134 (Mass. App. 1978). But see In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (refusing to
decide whether prior judicial approval is required for such termination of treatment).
100. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 495 (statement by the No Code
Subcommittee, Medical-Legal Interprofessional Committee, Bar Association of San Francisco
Medical Society) (emphasis added).
101. See Bernard L. Siegel, Perspectives of a Criminal Prosecutor, in BY No
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est in life does not differentiate between an act of commission, such as
the removal of life support, and an act of omission, such as the failure
to resuscitate.
10 2
Indeed, the state could require doctors to take affirmative steps
to preserve the "life" of those in a persistently vegetative state. Artifi-
cial organ surrogates, such as mechanical hearts and lung machines,
could be used to maintain the bodily functions of persistently vegeta-
tive patients, even though such a practice would divert those
resources from other patients. The persistently vegetative could
receive organ transplants. If two patients required an organ, but only
one were available, the quality of life of the vegetative patient could be
ignored in the decision. Indeed, if the state's interest were carried to
its natural conclusion, the state could redistribute society's resources
to maximize the quantum of life. It could maintain brain-dead bodies
to harvest needed organs. 0 3  The state's interest might justify the
removal of a persistently vegetative patient's organs or tissues to save
another life as long as the vegetative donor would persist."°
To be sure, the Missouri Supreme Court attempted to avoid such
absurd possibilities by limiting its analysis to patients who are not
terminally ill. Asserting an interest in the prolongation of the life of
the individual patient, the court borrowed a formula from Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital:10 5
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER
155, 156 (Joanne Lynn ed., 1986) ("[I]f a medical practitioner engages in conduct which is
intentional and planned and which necessarily, deliberately, and intentionally causes someone
to die, then that practitioner can be prosecuted for homicide, regardless of the good faith with
which that conduct is undertaken."). An act of omission rather than commission may not
entail intent that the patient would die, though the removal of life-supporting treatment
certainly would. However, given the high probability, if not certainty, that death would result,
an act of omission entails reckless disregard for the patient's life at the very least. Ultimately
there would be only a question of the degree of criminality that society would assign to the act.
Nevertheless, courts reject the prosecution of doctors in right to die cases. See, e.g., Barber v.
Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.),
cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
102. See DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 75, at 73-77 (discussing the lack
of an ethical distinction between acts of commission and omission). In a similar vein, Justice
Scalia noted the "irrelevance of the action-inaction distinction," though in the context of
suicide: "It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by walking into
the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide .... " Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2861 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. See Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 538 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988) (hospital
supported brain-dead body while trying to convince family to donate organs following their
refusal).
104. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2869 n. 13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing independent
state interests would justify taking tissues from and performing experiments on vegetative
patients).
105. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
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The concern for the preservation of the life of the patient normally
involves an interest in the prolongation of life. Thus, the state's
interest in preserving life is very high when "human life [can] be
saved where the affliction is curable." That interest wanes when
the underlying affliction is incurable and "would soon cause death
regardless of any medical treatment." The calculus shifts when the
issue is not "whether, but when, for how long, and at what cost to
the individual that life may be briefly extended."'0 6
Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he state's interest in prolonging life
is particularly valid in Nancy's case" because she "is not terminally
ill."' 7 But, given that the state has an unqualified interest in life, the
prognosis of the patient should have been irrelevant. 08
In Cruzan and cases like it, a tension exists between the policies
of prolonging life and ignoring its quality. There can be no "calculus
shifting" or interest that is "particularly valid" without examining the
quality of the individual patient's life, at least in terms of her
probability of persisting."'9 The Missouri Supreme Court avoided this
tension by noting that Nancy Cruzan was not terminally ill, and thus
both the prolongation of Cruzan's life and the state's unqualified
interest in life coincided. 10 But the moment the court moved from
exclusive reliance on its sanctity of life position, qualitative criteria
infected the court's analysis. Eventually the court will have to
address the tension squarely, while faced with the demands of a
patient who is terminally ill and who, through her family, wishes to
reject life-sustaining treatment. In such a case the court will likely
retreat from its sanctity of life position by allowing the patient's qual-
ity of life, implicitly or explicitly, to justify terminating treatment."'
In short, the strict sanctity of life position, relied upon by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, is
untenable.
106. Id. at 635 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977) and Commissioner of Corrections v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456
(Mass. 1979)), quoted in Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
107. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
108. Apparently the Missouri Supreme Court felt this tension as well. Ironically, after
adopting the Brophy calculus, later in its opinion the same majority criticized that decision for
discounting the state's interest. Id. at 421-22.
109. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 15-11, at 1366-68, 1368 n.24 (noting the tension between
preservation of life and ignorance of the quality of life in Brophy); see also Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d
at 421-22 (citing TRIBE with approval).
110. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
111. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)
(refusing to consider quality of life while evaluating probability of remission, age, and
painfulness of treatment).
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C. Critique of the Dissents
The two dissenting opinions in Cruzan each deliver the same
message: the state should attempt to defer right to die decisionmak-
ing to the private sphere. Justice Brennan's dissent advocates a sub-
stituted judgment method, relying almost exclusively upon the family
while the court simply examines the family's decisionmaking for
abuse."I2  In contrast, Justice Stevens proposes a best interests
approach, in which the court would decide whether or not treatment
would continue in light of the patient's condition and values.
13
Although under Justice Stevens' approach the court seems to govern
decisionmaking exclusively, a deeper examination reveals that the
court determines best interests by evaluating the patient's interests in
privacy and personhood, which in turn are determined by the family's
description of the patient's preferences. Thus, although the means
differ, the aim of each method is to protect a private sphere of auton-
omy. This aim is unworkable.
Justice Stevens stated that "the Constitution requires the State to
care for Nancy Cruzan's life in a way that gives appropriate respect to
her own best interests." ' 14 This statement, of course, begs the ques-
tions of what Nancy's best interests are, and how they are discovered.
Though Stevens' opinion does not explicitly answer these questions,
his analysis underscores the conclusions of the trial judge, who found
that Nancy had no cognitive ability or possibility of recovery," and
the guardians ad litem, who considered termination of treatment to be
in Nancy's best interests. 1 6 Thus, a patient's prognosis and quality of
life, decided by independent parties, are material in deciding her best
interests. Stevens also accepted the clear and convincing standard,"I7
but not the state's interest in life independent of Nancy's own inter-
est.' 8 The best interests method thus requires a court to make sub-
stantive choices about treatment, given the limitations of the patient's
present state, but informed by the individual's values.
Because the court ultimately controls which of the patient's val-
ues will be considered and how they will be weighed, the best interests
method risks being paternalistic. While the court may claim that it
112. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
114. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2879 (1990).
115. Id. at 2879 n.2, 2879-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (outlining the trial court's findings
about Nancy's physical condition).
116. Id. at 2880 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the guardian ad litem's finding
that removal of Nancy's gastrointestinal tube was in her best interests).
117. Id. at 2889.
118. Id. at 2890.
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seeks to determine what would be best for the patient in terms of the
patient's own values, the trial judge's values may in fact enter into the
court's decision. 119 More careful scrutiny indicates that an element of
paternalism may be justified-indeed, required-for the sake of lib-
erty.120 To be sure, if the court entirely ignores the individual's val-
ues, it denies the very liberty interest that it intends to protect. 12 1 The
ideal of pure respect for another person's wishes ignores the fact that
individual preferences are often shaped by circumstances, constraints
of information, and other factors.1 22 To that extent, preferences are
nonautonomous, and there is no a priori reason to accord them abso-
lute respect. It is doubtful, for example, that a competent person can
fully fathom the experience and meaning of being in a persistently
vegetative state, at least not without far more sustained reflection than
many people are likely to give the matter.1 23  For that reason, the
court may properly discount the patient's own wishes in some cases,
even if in so doing the judge's own values may enter into the best-
interests calculus. In that sense, the decision to terminate or continue
life support will always be paternalistic. By rejecting an independent
state interest in life, Stevens rejects the wholesale substitution of the
state's values, but by accepting the heightened evidentiary burden,
Stevens promotes the procedural "paternalism" that examines the
basis of proposed desires of the patient to be sure they are a product of
individual autonomy to the extent possible.
The best interests analysis depends upon the interests defined by
the patient herself. Stevens' sharpest criticisms of the Missouri
119. Indeed, to the extent that judges attempt to consider the patient's values through the
lens of a "reasonable person" under the best interests standard, they increase the probability of
displacing the patient's own needs and values. See Dresser, supra note 52, at 383 (noting that,
by trying to objectify the patient's interests, "judicial opinions have at times incorrectly
attributed to the incompetent patient the concerns of others, raising questions about whose
interests the court decisions actually serve"); Rhoden, supra note 23, at 398-403 (criticizing
the objective analysis of best interests for examining only the patient's present, physical
condition).
120. Paternalism is justified where, for example, the patient's desires arise from a distorted
view of reality. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1171; see also infra notes 280-90 and
accompanying text (describing the potential for erroneous death decisions once the right-to-die
becomes firmly entrenched).
121. This has been the chief criticism of the best interests approach. See TRIBE, supra note
4, § 15-11, at 1367-68. The criticism breaks down in cases where the patient was born
incompetent. Compare Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass.
1986) with Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
122. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1138-39 (cataloguing distorted preferences that may
justify government intervention).
123. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of a competent
person to fathom the state of being incompetent).
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Supreme Court's decision-its denial of Nancy's own conceptions of
life and death 124 and its adoption of an unqualified interest in life for
symbolic effect 125 -arise because those actions are truly paternalistic.
To define best interests without invoking the patient's own values tac-
itly substitutes the state's values for those of the patient. Stevens
chastises the Missouri Supreme Court for creating an "opposition of
life andliberty" bY neither defining Nancy's life "by reference to her
own interests," nor questioning whether "Nancy Cruzan herself
defined life to encompass every form of biological persistence by a
human being."' 126 Such references to the patient's values indicate that
the "best interests" analysis is a court-appraised judgment of Nancy's
own wishes.
Justice Brennan's dissent is less complex, outlining two roles for
the state, both of which safeguard the patient's autonomy through
procedural mechanisms. First, where the patient has expressed inten-
tions regarding treatment, the state as parens patriae 127 should deter-
mine those intentions as accurately as possible and, if need be,
effectuate them. 128 Second, where it is not possible to ascertain the
patient's treatment decision, the state should ensure that at least the
surrogate decisionmaker would be the patient's choice, excluding any
person with improper motives. ' 29 The state itself should resolve treat-
ment decisions only in the exceptional case where the patient had no
relative or other suitable proxy. 130 The decision is thus made by the
patient through her family or another designated person, either as an
instrumentality of the patient's intentions or as a proxy for the
patient. In Brennan's view, the family's dominant role is justified in
the first instance because the testimony of family members best indi-
cates the patient's desire, and in the second, because the family mem-
bers' bonds with the patient place them in a better position than the
124. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2885-86 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2889.
126. Id. In this passage, Stevens emphasized that life could be defined by "any of her own
interests," or the persistently vegetative state would define her life if there were "any evidence"
that was her wish. Id. The use of such a minimal basis for best-interests decisionmaking
could, of course, lead to paternalism. Justice Stevens may have merely been emphasizing the
Missouri Court's ignorance of Cruzan's own values.
127. Parens Patriae, "literally 'parent of the country,' refers to role of state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
In its role as parens patriae, the court decides what is in the "best interests" of an incompetent
patient. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977).
128. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




state to decide for the patient.13 1
In practice, the best interests and substituted judgment tests will
often resemble each other. In applying the "best interests" test, the
trial court found that Nancy was irrecoverably, persistently vegeta-
tive, that she did not want to be medically supported (at least as well
as anyone could tell), and that no other significant interests beyond
those of the family and the hospital was involved. 132  Upon these
determinations of fact, the judge empowered Nancy's parents, as her
guardians, to terminate treatment. 33 Thus in practice, at least in
Cruzan, the trial court's role in its "best interest" determination
closely tracks the role espoused by Brennan, in which the court seeks
to perform the patient's wishes and prevent abuses. The practical
resemblance ends, however, where the patient is incompetent and ter-
minally ill, but conscious. Under the best interests test, the patient's
state of consciousness would evince a greater realm of possibilities-a
higher "quality of life" that the court must consider, even if the fam-
ily's values dictate otherwise. In that event, Stevens's best interests
construct might not empower the family, whereas Brennan's method
would.'34 Despite these differences, however, both the dissents'
schemes seek to defer to the individual, to the individual through the
family, or to the family itself.
Although the dissenting opinions empower those persons closest
to the patient, they ignore the more difficult issue of who in fact is, or
who should be, closest. Inevitably, the court empowers someone. By
the very nature of its role, the court distributes decisionmaking
authority, even in those instances where it ostensibly does not
empower anyone.135 To take the extreme examples, compare Justice
Scalia's treatment of the Cruzan case with that of Justice Brennan. In
response to the family's challenge, derivatively in the name of the
patient, Justice Scalia would dismiss the case, and thereby reaffirm the
alignment of power in the status quo-that is, in favor of the medical
establishment, which refused to terminate the treatment, or the State
131. Id.
132. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 432-34 (Mo. 1988).
133. See id. at 434 ("In this case the Court acts only to authorize the Co-guardians to
exercise our Ward's constitutionally guaranteed liberty to request the Respondents to withhold
nutrition and hydration. The Co-guardians are required only to exercise their legal authority
to act in the best interests of their Ward as they discharge their duty and are free to act or not
with this authority as they may determine.").
134. Compare 110 S. Ct. at 2889 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (state's interests increase as
patient's level of consciousness rises) with 110 S. Ct. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(empowering the proxy in every event).
135. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 328 (1990).
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of Missouri, which imposed its independent ideological interest in
life.136 On the other hand, Justice Brennan would defer to private
decisionmaking by merely authorizing the proxy whom the patient
would have chosen. But even this deference empowers select individ-
uals to perform as surrogates to the exclusion of others who may wish
to make the decision, thereby profoundly affecting those who claim
affinity with the patient. Thus, the notion of the state's refraining
from intervention is illusory. 137  The state and the family are inti-
mately and inextricably interrelated.
III. DEFINING THE PATIENT'S FAMILY
The courts intuitively turn to the family when choosing an
incompetent patient's surrogate decisionmakers.' 3s Family members
seem to be the best authorities, even if the court cannot know that
their views would match those of the patient, because there is no "rea-
son to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the
patient would have made than someone who knew the patient inti-
mately."' 139 The persons with whom the patient had formed mutual
emotional bonds "treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol
of a cause."'"
Not every family, however, consists of such loving and caring
persons. 41' Indeed, the family can be-and often is-the locus of vio-
lence and sexual abuse, hidden from view all the more effectively
136. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that "the federal courts have no business in
this field"; that is, the Due Process Clause does not govern a state's regulation of the life and
death of its citizens. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859. Regulatory abuses are prevented by "the
Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and
their loved ones what they impose on you and me." Id. at 2863.
137. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985) (arguing that the state's treatment of the family is too incoherent
to justify the notion of a private sphere of family life).
138. Legislatures instinctively turn to the family as well. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-
12-4(a)(2) (Burns 1990) (authorizing "a spouse, parent, adult child, or adult sibling unless
disqualified" where an incompetent patient has not appointed a health care representative and
there is no judicially appointed guardian); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991)
(interpreting the Indiana Code as allowing the family to terminate medical treatment without
court intervention).
139. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987)).
141. To some extent, both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Cruzan recognized
this. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855; id. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2890 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with the Court that "in some cases there may be a conflict between the
interests of an incompetent patient and the interests of members of her family"). Indeed, in
asserting that "a State generally must either repose the choice with whom the person would
most likely have chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the patient's family," Justice Brennan
implies that the family should have authority, but only if there is no preferable surrogate. Id.
at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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because it is deemed private.142 Doubtless, the parents who abuse
their infant to the point of brain death should not have the same state
support for their relationships as loving parents. 143 Chronic illness
itself is an event that precipitates changes in attachment and detach-
ment in the conventional family.' Consequently, the courts must
use norms more penetrating than kinship in analyzing the relationship
between the incompetent patient and those who claim control over
the patient's destiny.
By authorizing persons to make life and death decisions solely on
the basis of their marriage or kinship relation to the patient, courts
risk the possibility that family members will disregard the patient's
own treatment preferences or best interests. One example is the case
of Christine Busalacchi, a woman on the same ward at the Missouri
Rehabilitation Center ("MRC") as Nancy Cruzan. 145 Although
Christine obviously was severely impaired, the extent of her brain
damage was unknown.'46 The MRC refused to perform an extensive
neurological diagnosis on her, claiming it was not essential to her
treatment.' 47  The Center intended to discharge Christine, but her
father could not secure placement for her at a nursing home in Mis-
souri.148  Christine's father sought to remove her for treatment in
Minnesota, which allows greater discretion in ending treatment. 14 9
The local probate judge approved the decision made between the fam-
ily and the physician despite a lack of clear evidence of the patient's
wishes. Impressed by the dialogue between the family and the physi-
cian, the judge commented, "[The doctor] didn't say one word about
142. Studies of domestic violence reveal abuse of spouses, children, and parents. See, e.g.,
MILDRED D. PAGELOW, FAMILY VIOLENCE (1984) (general study of family abuse);
ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY (1987) (tracing history of society's treatment of
family violence in the United States); see also John C. Koski, Comment, Idaho v. Wright: The
Defenestation of Corroborating Evidence, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 205, 206-07 (1991) (describing
sexual abuse in Wright).
143. Compare Alvarado v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 547 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup.
Ct. 1989) (court permitted removal of life support where Jehovah's Witness parents disputed
hospital's determination of infant's death), order vacated, Alvarado v. City of New York, 550
N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 1990) with Dority v. Superior Court, 1193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (life support for brain-dead child over the objection of parents charged with child
abuse).
144. See Amy H. Gervasio, Family Relationships and Compliance, in COMPLIANCE: THE
DILEMMA OF THE CHRONICALLY ILL 98 (Kenneth E. Gerber & Alexis M. Nehemis eds.,
1986) (discussing the effects of chronic illness on relationships among family members).
145. Father Wins a Ruling on Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at AI5.
146. In 1987, Christine was diagnosed as being in a persistently vegetative state, but the
State altered its position when it challenged her removal. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, slip. op.
at 11 (Mo. Ct. App. March 5, 1991).
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3-4.
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the courts.... I think that's the way it should be and the way it has
been since time immemorial."' 0
In a split decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the state may forbid a guardian to remove his
ward from Missouri, absent evidence that removal is in the ward's
best interests.' The appellate court was troubled that Christine's
father may not have been acting in her best interests, despite the trial
judge's finding that the guardian's primary purpose was not to remove
the feeding tube. 5 2 The court expressly challenged the motives of
Christine's father: "[W]e will not permit [the] guardian to forum shop
in an effort to control whether Christine lives or dies."'
153
The Busalacchi case illustrates the potential difficulties that arise
in an unexamined delegation of control to the family. The trial
judge's comment revealed his feelings about how such decisions
should be made: where the doctor and the family agree, the court
should not intrude. But this approach is unworkable for two reasons.
First, courts cannot take for granted who "the family" is. Second,
courts cannot ignore the possibility that whoever the family may be,
its motivations may be questionable. To be sure, the court's concern
should not automatically be that those who have an emotional bond
will act to relieve their own grief. If the patient and loved one shared
a bond of mutual care, relieving the loved one's grief would be in the
interests of the patient as well. '" The more compelling concern arises
from the possibility that the family member is acting not out of an
emotional tie with the incompetent patient, but with more selfish
motives, or even if in good faith, under the pressures created by soci-
ety that makes health care a major personal financial burden.
A. The Form and Substance of the Family
The problems that Busalacchi illustrates stem from the state's
150. Father Wins a Ruling on Right to Die, supra note 145.
151. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, slip. op. at 16-17 (Mo. Ct. App. March 5, 1991).
Interestingly, the court distinguished Cruzan, in an effort to isolate the patient's Fourteenth
Amendment rights from the guardian's privileged position as a delegatee of the State's parens
patriae authority. Id.
152. Id. at 5-6.
153. Id. at 17. The possibility of forum shopping reveals a complication with leaving
solutions to the protection of the patient's liberty interest to "the 'laboratory' of the States."
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). Busalacchi reveals a tension between the heightened requirements for the
right to die and the more easily enjoyed constitutional right to interstate travel. See
Busalacchi, slip. op. at 28-29 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)).
154. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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treatment of the family as a timeless association of nurturing parents
and children. The Supreme Court views the family relationship as so
well-founded by tradition that it repeatedly supports the family's role
in substantive due process cases, implying family rights from beyond
the text of the Constitution. 5 ' For example, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters ' 56 the Supreme Court refused to allow
any general power of the State to standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.' 57
The traditional, nuclear family consists of a household of parents and
their children.'58 The role of the family as educator and nurturer of
the child, however, is a particularly modem phenomenon. For exam-
ple, during the middle ages, children did not go to school. 59 Rather,
they learned a trade by apprenticeship with a virtual stranger.1I° The
communal nature of the village in medieval times facilitated this rela-
tionship. 16 1 When the medieval period ended and schooling substi-
tuted for apprenticeship in social initiation, the modem concept of the
family's role in the child's direction took hold.' 62 Thus, the school's
and the family's duty as educator arose coincidentally, around the
seventeenth century.'63 Finally, in the eighteenth century, the mod-
em family surfaced as an enclave apart from society.'
The contrast between the structure of the family now and in the
medieval age reveals that the family is a social organization of a form
155. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
156. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
157. Id. at 535.
158. Dictionary meanings reflect our common perceptions of "family." Family "[m]ost
commonly refers to group of persons consisting of parents and children; father, mother, and
their children; immediate kindred, constituting fundamental social unit in a civilized society."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (5th ed. 1979). Similarly, Webster's defines family as the
"household," but alternatively "a social unit consisting of parents and the children that they
rear." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 505 (2d ed. 1980). More precisely, however,
this is the conventional "nuclear" family; the extended family consists of those related by
kinship.
159. PHILLIPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 367 (1962) (noting that schooling was
reserved for the clergy).
160. Id. at 366.
161. Id. at 366-69.
162. Id. at 369-70.
163. Id. at 370, 403 ("[T]he modern family originated at the same time as the school, or at
least as the general habit of educating children at school.").
164. Id. at 406. Novel health objectives of .the eighteenth century also buttressed the
formation of the family's role as child-rearer. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Politics of Health
in the Eighteenth Century, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 166, 173 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin
Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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varying through history and among cultures.1 6  Though this social
unit seems "natural," in part because it appears to arise from biologi-
cal reproduction, "nature" is a poor justification for the family.' 66
Ultimately, the nuclear family can legitimate itself only by serving the
needs of its members for mutual, emotional security, and society's
need to train its children.1 67 When the nuclear family fails to meet
these needs, new social forms must replace it.'
16
Because the family itself is indeterminate, courts can never sim-
ply defer to the family. Indeed, through family-rights discourse, the
courts themselves constitute the family by defining its legitimate
roles.' 69 The instrumentality of the family effectively defines a person
by channeling him or her into a prevailing structure of obligations
and rights, then attaching associated tasks and rewards to the individ-
ual's self-definition. 7 ° Not only do the courts provide a means of
165. See STEPHANIE CooNTz, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIVATE LIFE 13, 13-18 (1988)
(describing family as "a way of organizing or symbolizing certain kinds of group interactions
in terms of personal relations").
166. Id.; see also MICHELE BARRETT & MARY McINTosH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY 26-
29 (1982); id. at 34-40 (noting that biology does not, and indeed should not, dictate social
organization and control).
167. BARRETr & MCINTOSH, supra note 166, at 21-26.
168. If indeed the form of the nuclear family's replacement will be definite, it is presently
unresolved. Considering society's present state of rapid change, the "postmodern family" is
almost an oxymoron. See JUDITH STACY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES 16-19 (1990); see also
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984)
(arguing that the modern disintegration of the nuclear family requires a broader concept of
parenthood).
169. The substantive due process cases illustrate the Court's individualizing discourse. In
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961), Justice Harlan provided an evocative discussion:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and social context in which children are born and brought up,
as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which
express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage,
form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
If the laws are a "pattern pressed into the substance of our social life," beneath this pattern are
the individualizing forces that such discourse produces: the adulterer, the fornicator, the
homosexual, and indeed, the child and the married persons.
Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), the Court's discourse
reinforces an individualizing concept of proper sexual and social interaction:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. The association promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in prior decisions.
By announcing a right to privacy arising from "an association for as noble a purpose as any,"
Justice Douglas unfortunately propagates an ignoble, excluded class along with a presumed
"traditional" one.
170. See COoNTz, supra note 165, at 13-17; see also FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY,
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identifying individuals within the family, thereby relegating them to a
particular social position; they also effectively differentiate, exclude,
and disempower individuals outside the family. 1 The concept of
family defines its members in relation both to each other and to soci-
ety.172 To the extent that family-rights discourse alters our self-per-
ception by propagating unreflective acceptance of a social unit as
legitimate and unchanging, it increases the likelihood that we will
ignore the true values upon which we should base treatment deci-
sions. Family-rights discourse does not harm merely by wrongfully
including or excluding certain decisionmakers. It also harms by bid-
ding us to treat as fixed and unchanging what is socially constructed
and potentially contested.
The courts have tended to propagate this discourse, viewing the
family as a fixed social form without regard to its substantive
effects. 173  The Supreme Court invoked this formal approach in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 1 4 a case that highlights the inadequacy of
simple reliance on marriage or blood ties in defining the family. In
supra note 4, at 212 (Power "applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a
law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him.").
For some, the family's greatest benefit to society is its individualization of its members:
When the legal system ... protects such relationships as kinship and formal
marriage, it advances not only the individual interests involved, but society's
interest in social and political structures that sustain long-term individual
liberty. . . . [T]he structure of marriage and kinship responds to that social
interest by maximizing the interest of children and society in a stable family
environment; by ensuring a socialization process and an attitude toward personal
obligation that maximizes democracy's interest in the voluntary "public virtue"
of its citizens; by maintaining marriage and kinship as legally recognizable
structures that mediate between the individual and the State, thereby limiting
governmental power; and by maintaining sources of objective jurisprudence that
will ensure stable personal expectations and encourage generality of laws, thereby
minimizing the arbitrary power of the State.
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balanc-
ing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 559 (1983).
171. Michel Foucault deems this phenomenon "identification." FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY, supra note 4, at 42-43.
172. See CooNTz, supra note 165, at 13-17; FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra
note 4, at 221, 222 ("The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and
putting in order the possible outcome.").
173. The court's method of applying rights and duties strictly by relation of blood,
adoption, or marriage is the "formal approach." Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance:
The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1644-45 (1991); see also Olsen, supra note 137, at 847-48. The courts conceive of the
family as a private sphere, but in fact they do not consistently treat it as an autonomous body.
Id. at 842-46. See generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 1135 (reviewing judicial treatment of the family and concluding that the public/private
distinction is unhelpful).
174. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)
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that case, Michael sued to establish paternity of his alleged natural
daughter, Victoria. 75 The child was born while her mother was mar-
ried to Gerald, and an 1872 California statute established that a child
born within a marriage is the product of the marriage. Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion rejected Michael's substantive due process claim
because the relationship of a natural, extramarital father is not
"treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society."176
The case might not have been exceptional if Michael were simply
an "outsider," disrupting the family and frustrating the best interests
of the child. But Michael H. was "almost certainly Victoria D.'s nat-
ural father, lived with her as her father, contributed to her support,
and from the beginning sought to strengthen and maintain his rela-
tionship with her."'177 Moreover, Victoria's father-by-marriage lived
apart from her for years, while her mother continued an intermittent
relationship with Michael. 7 In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized
the plurality for using tradition to mask the more difficult issue of the
norms presumed by its ruling and their relation to the facts of the
case. 179 The importance of tradition is not to define the interests that
society will protect, but rather to indicate those values that society
considers important. Rather than the "unitary family," society tradi-
tionally protects the parent-child relationship, where it is marked by
emotional commitment and responsibility.'8 0
Another case, Alison D. v. Virginia M, , 8 illustrates a "natural,"
biological justification of the formal approach. Alison and Virginia
were lesbian partners who, after having a relationship for a few years,
decided to have a child. The two planned the conception and agreed
to share the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. Virginia
became pregnant by artificial insemination and ultimately gave birth.
For two years and four months the couple raised the child together,
but ultimately they ended their relationship. Alison continued to visit
175. Blood tests established a 98.07% probability that Michael was the father. Id. at 2337.
176. Id. at 2342.
177. Id. at 2352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2337.
179. Id. at 2349 ("Because reasonable people can disagree about the content of particular
traditions, and because they can disagree even about which traditions are relevant to the
definition of 'liberty,' the plurality has not found the objective boundary that it seeks.")
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The "objective boundary" to which Justice Brennan refers is a form
of judicial restraint, attempting to forbid "judges to substitute their own preferences for those
of elected officials." Id. Formalism gives the illusion of judicial restraint, when in reality it is
an unexamined imposition the judge's presupposed norms.
180. Id. at 2352.
181. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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the child, who referred to each parent as "Mommy," until Virginia
terminated all such interaction. When Alison sued for visitation
rights, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal and refused to recognize her as a parent: "[S]he is not the
biological mother of the child nor is she a legal parent by virtue of an
adoption."1"2 Ostensibly deferring to the legislature, the court refused
to "read the term parent.., to include categories of nonparents who
have developed a relationship with a child or who have had prior rela-
tionships with a child's parents and who wish to continue visitation
with the child."'
' 83
The danger of empowering certain persons as family members is
that it may exclude other "loved ones" with whom the patient has a
mutual emotional bond. This situation occurs primarily in so-called
"non-traditional" relationships, where the loved one was neither mar-
ried to the patient nor a member of the patient's conventional family.
In some cases there is no dispute, because the family and the loved
one agree on what the patient would want or what would be in the
patient's best interests. 84 But if the family and the loved one disa-
gree, their conflict can erupt into a bitter battle for control of the
patient, leaving the loved one disempowered and without legal
recourse.
Such a conflict arose over Sharon Kowalski, who was left physi-
cally and mentally impaired by an automobile accident.18  Sharon's
182. Id. at 29.
183. Id. The dissent responded that the legislature had never defined "parent" specifically,
and the court could easily have interpreted the term to effectuate the legislative purpose of
supporting the best interests of the child. Id. at 31.
There is a stunning contrast between the New York court's formal approach in this case
and its more reasoned, normative approach in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y.
1989). See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 173, at 1648-
50 (contrasting Braschi with the formalism of the Appellate Division's decision in Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1990), aff'd, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991)). Perhaps the
distinction is that Braschi dealt with housing and Alison D. with child custody, which is
obviously more central to the conventional concept of family. Consequently, the New York
Court of Appeals may have believed that broadening the definition of family in the child
custody setting would be a radical departure from existing social values, reflected in prior
statutory interpretations. See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 ("While one may dispute in an
individual case whether it would be beneficial to a child to have continued contact with a
nonparent, the Legislature did not.., give such nonparent the opportunity to compel a fit
parent to allow them to do so."). As Associate Judge Judith S. Kaye asked, "How would we
not be fundamentally redefining the term 'parent' throughout the statutory law and case law of
the State of New York?" Kevin Sack, Crux of Visitation Case: Definition of Parenthood, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 24, 1991, at Y20.
184. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988) (four brothers and
unmarried partner agreed that patient would want to discontinue life support).
185. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Sharon
Kowalski's accident left her confined to a wheelchair, able to communicate only by hand and
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four-year partner and lesbian lover, Karen Thompson, petitioned to
become her guardian. Sharon Kowalski's father cross-petitioned for
the appointment. 8 6 The court initially found "each to be a suitable
and qualified person to discharge the trust," but by agreement of the
parties, Sharon Kowalski's father became the guardian, while both
had equal access to medical and financial records, the right to consult
with medical and financial personnel, and visitation rights. 8 7 At one
point, after the relationship between Karen Thompson and Sharon
Kowalski's father deteriorated, Karen Thompson lost her rights on
behalf of Sharon, including visitation, because the court found that
Thompson's presence was not in Sharon's "best interest."'
l8 8
The father's initial success in Kowalski stemmed from medical
evidence that Sharon became depressed after Karen Thompson's vis-
its.'8 9 But the language and rationale of the opinion were extraordi-
nary. The court essentially agreed with the father's assertion that "his
confirmation as guardian is proper because he is the ward's father and
therefore has unconditional parental love for his daughter."'' 9° The
father's relationship was presumptively legitimate and beneficial to
the incompetent patient, whereas the homosexual lover's position
needed the support of the ward's choice.' 9 ' Since Sharon Kowalski
was incompetent, she could not effectively make a choice, and the
facial movements, and with the mental capacity of a child between four and six years old. Id.
at 863.
186. Id. at 863.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 864. Sharon's father, Donald Kowalski, objected to Karen Thompson's role at
least in part because of his rejection of homosexuality: "It's just not a normal life style. The
Bible will tell you that." Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Dissent and the Family, 253 NATION 406,
408 (1991). He also described Thompson to reporters as "an animal" who was lying about his
daughter's lesbianism. Id.
189. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 864. The Missouri Court of Appeals noted, however, that
"[a] pattern has developed indicating that Thompson's visits may produce significant responses
from the ward, but the ward regularly experiences depression and moodiness following
Thompson's visits." Id. at 866. Stated this way, the end of Thompson's visit could have been
the cause of the depression as easily as the visit itself. See David Link, The Tie that Binds"
Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex Couples, 23 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
1055, 1138 (noting support for the possibility that "Sharon missed Thompson when she was
gone"). The opinion, however, focuses strictly upon the effect of depression rather than its
cause. Id.
190. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 865. Thompson argued that she was effectively Kowalski's
spouse. Id. Though the court did not discredit that argument entirely, it considered "the
strong confidential relationship which exists between parent and child" to be as or more
important. Id.
191. Id. The language of the opinion revealed the court's homophobia. The court
discounted the strength of the relationship by referring to Thompson as Sharon's "friend" and
"roommate," and stating that their lesbian relationship was merely "claimed," even though
the two exchanged rings and named one another as beneficiaries of life insurance. Id. at 863;
see also Link, supra note 189, at 1136. Compare In re Guardianship of Friedman, No. C2-91-
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court would not recognize the legitimacy of her partner's position. 192
Thus, initially the court allowed the father, with some supporting
medical evidence, 193 to dominate the incompetent patient and, deriva-
tively, her loved one.
Ultimately Karen Thompson received guardianship over Sharon
Kowalski, but only after the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the
trial court's refusal of Thompson's renewed petition to be clearly erro-
neous.' 94 Sharon Kowalski's father had to remove himself as guard-
ian due to his own medical problems, but the family nevertheless
continued to oppose Thompson's appointment by trying to install a
"neutral third party" as successor.19 At first the family was success-
ful: the trial court appointed Karen Tomberlin, a friend of the
Kowalskis, to be guardian. 96 In its reversal, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals noted that "Thompson and Sharon are a family of affinity,
which ought to be accorded respect,"' 197 ending seven years of litiga-
tion that Karen Thompson described as "a nightmare."198
1047, 1991 WL 263225, at 'I (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1991) (noting early in the opinion that
Karen Thompson was Sharon Kowalski's lesbian partner).
192. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 865.
193. As Kowalski's guardian, the father had a duty to limit the ward's personal freedom
"'only to the extent to provide needed care and services.'" Id. at 866 (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 525.56(3)(6) (1984)). The court could only grant to the guardian or conservator necessary
powers to fulfill demonstrated needs. Id. However, prompted by Kowalski's physicians, the
court determined that "[q]uietude [was] essential to a patient's recovery or improvement and
in the patient's best interests." Id. at 866. Moreover, the ward was incompetent; even if
Sharon Kowalski could effectively communicate her desire to continue the visits, "the
reliability of her responses [was] uncertain." Id. at 867. Reactions of excitement or depression
from her association with Thompson were equivalently unhealthy. Since Kowalski needed
quiet, and quiet was incompatible with free association, the father could exclude visitation
rights entirely.
194. Friedman, No. C2-91-1047, 1991 WL 263225.
195. Id. at "5.
196. Id. at '5-6. The ruling of the Minnesota Court of Appeals revealed the trial court's
bias against Karen Thompson. It noted that Tomberlin, the "neutral" third party, as hardly
impartial; she testified that "her first and primary goal as guardian was to relocate Sharon ...
close to her family." Id. at "6. Moreover, the trial court chose Tomberlin without questioning
Tomberlin's relationship with or ability to care for Sharon, id. at '5, and without formal
petition or sufficient notice to the parties. Id. at "6. The Minnesota Court of Appeals found
that "the record is clear that at all times, the focus of the evidentiary hearing was to evaluate
Thompson's qualifications to be guardian, not to evaluate the qualification of Tomberlin." Id.
at *5.
197. Id. at "7. The court also based its holding on medical evidence that Sharon Kowalski
was competent to choose and in fact did choose Karen Thompson, and that Thompson was an
able caretaker. Id. It approved of Thompson's revelation of the lesbian relationship, but for
medical reasons: "[I]t is crucial for doctors to understand who their patient was prior to the
accident, including that patient's sexuality." Id. at "6.
198. Ruben Rosario, Lesbian Wins Right to Care for Disabled Lover, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18,
1991, at 9A, col. 3.
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B. Loved Ones and the Normative Approach to Family
The immediate danger of the courts' protection of marriage and
kinship is the possibility that it will obscure deeper concerns of right
to die decisionmaking. The incompetent patient needs substitute deci-
sionmakers with her best interests in mind, who will also consider her
values. Relatives by blood or marriage may indeed be the correct per-
sons to make such a determination. However, they are not automati-
cally so. Treating relatives as if they are the presumptively proper
decisionmakers increases the probability that the incompetent patient
will suffer a wrongfully motivated decision. It also excludes from the
decisionmaking process other loved ones whose values may be more
harmonious with those of the patient.
In order to avoid the harm of an unexamined delegation of power
to the family, courts should examine the norms upon which the fam-
ily is based. Love, according to one philosopher, is formed by the
mutual surrender of the individual personality.199 The family is an
intuitively appealing decisionmaker because we consider it marked by
love; it represents the caring, mutually supportive relationships that
we value most. Society's preconceptions, however, should not dictate
the outcome of family-rights disputes. Rather, the court should pre-
serve the individual's own long-term relationships by identifying the
characteristics that society admires in such relationships, such as
long-term emotional commitment and interdependence, and use them
to analyze the dispute in question.2"° The judiciary must continue to
articulate society's values, but apply them in a less formal way.
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Braschi v. Stahl
Associates20 ' is an excellent example of such an approach. In Braschi,
the court judged the issue of whether a New York City regulation
denying the right of the landlord to dispossess "either the surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased
tenant's family" would apply to protect a homosexual partner of ten
199. Georg W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, in THE EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHERS FROM DESCARTES TO NIETZSCHE 537, 574 (Monroe Beardsley ed., 1960).
This conception of love is platonic, removed from sexuality to whatever extent is possible. A
feminist critique might deem mutual compassion a more apt description. See Ruth Colker,
Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1101, 1022-28 (1989) (defining "love" as "the experience of intimate interconnectedness,
including but not limited to sexual love," and "compassion" as "a fully empathetic attitude").
200. One analysis describes this as the "functional approach." Note, supra note 173, at
1646. However, the method does not examine the relationship to determine whether it fulfills
a particular function analogous to one of the traditional nuclear family. Instead it seeks those
values that society chooses should be preserved, without regard to their existence in the
traditional family. Thus, the "normative approach" is more apt.
201. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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years.20 2 Resolving the case in the partner's favor, the court applied a
progressive four-part test of "family" which examined "the exclusiv-
ity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and finan-
cial commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted
their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reli-
ance placed upon one another for daily family services. "203
Two basic criticisms might be made of such a normative
approach. The first, offered by the Braschi dissent, focuses on the
highly subjective nature of the test.2°  The court offered little gui-
dance for its determination of family status beyond a "totality of the
relationship" standard. Such a loose standard allows courts to disre-
gard the wishes of an incompetent patient's loved ones by ruling
according to their preconceptions of family. For example, a judge
faced with the facts in Kowalski could find that Kowalski's father had
a longer and more exclusive relationship with his daughter than did
her lesbian lover of four years. The conventional family, in that case,
would merely assume a new discourse.
This argument, however, assumes that courts will be left with
near-unfettered discretion in deciding what a family is. It ignores the
fact that, once the courts indicate a willingness to look beyond the
confines of a traditional definition, people with nontraditional rela-
tionships to the patient are more likely to insist that the courts recog-
nize their claims. The more the new form of family is accepted, the
more the previously. excluded loved ones will consider themselves
entitled to participate in their loved one's treatment decisions. The
heightened awareness of non-traditional relationships reshapes indi-
vidual preferences, and perhaps ultimately, social norms them-
selves. 2 5  The courts themselves will not be immune to such
reshaping.
202. Id. at 49.
203. Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 67 (Simons, J., dissenting). For comprehensive reviews of the Braschi decision,
see Eileen Kaspar, Comment, Braschi v. StahL. Family Redefined, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTs. 289 (1990); Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361 (1990).
205. Simply put, people tend to want only what they realize they can get. Professor Cass
Sunstein calls this phenomenon of "adaptive preferences." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1146-50.
Traditional gender and class roles use adaptive preferences as a means of reducing civil unrest,
to preserve the status quo. Id. at 1154. Sunstein's theories of ideology and adaptive
preferences thus resemble Foucault's theories of power and discourse. Compare supra note 4
(discussing Foucault's theories). By changing the traditional roles, or at least recognizing
other roles, the government allows persons to form their desires more freely. Sunstein, supra
note 4, at 1154; cf David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979
(1991) (advocating the use of the therapeutic aspects of the legal process).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The second criticism of the normative approach is that it requires
the court to make rulings beyond its competence-that is, on whether
the patient and the potential surrogate were bound by a loving rela-
tionship. As a fundamental aspect of our self-definition, love consti-
tutes one's personhood, arguably something that a court is or should
be unfit to determine. A court's decision that someone does or does
not love the patient is intuitively distasteful. If the court errs, its rul-
ing is now doubly hurtful: the court, as the mouthpiece of society, has
told you that you do not love someone you really do.
This criticism fails to recognize that, although they are an aspect
of personhood, interpersonal relationships exist in the vortex of soci-
ety.2  Persons involved in disputes over an incompetent patient's
desires cannot escape public scrutiny. In such disputes, the court
inevitably judges the potential surrogate's relationship with the
patient. Presently, tacit presumptions about the traditional family
dominate that judgment. The real issue is whether finding true loved
ones outside of presumptions about the family justifies the additional
intrusiveness of evaluating the relationship between the patient and
the potential surrogate.
The court is no more unfit to decide such a matter of compassion
than it is any other issue. The judiciary faces its recurring epistemo-
logical paradox: it must determine who has a subjective and thus
unknowable value, like love, through objective, knowable criteria, like
shared commitments. As in all the tests of mental states, the court
ultimately defines the abstractions, like intent, mens rea, or love, using
their socially recognized manifestations. 20 7 Inevitably the decision of
an individual case rests upon evaluations of the parties' manifestations
of mutual devotion. By requiring love and describing the badges of
love, the court promotes such compassion and its incidents. 208 We
206. Aspects of personhood are never free from conflict unless they are entirely self-
regarding. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 758. As defined here, love requires mutuality-love
between the patient and surrogate-and therefore it cannot be exclusively personal. In the
context of right-to-die analysis, love is important only to the extent that it is shared between
the patient and the surrogate. A person who feels unreciprocated compassion for a patient is
presumably incapable of truly understanding the desires of the patient.
207. Indeed, since all mental states are unknowable abstractions, legal effects essentially
arise from acts themselves, interpreted through social generalizations. Cf Peter M. Tiersma,
The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 189 (1986) (proposing that speech acts govern the issue of intent in contract formation).
208. In the past, the Supreme Court considered voicing the fundamental values of our
society as its essential role. The language of the Court in cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which found a married couple's right to contraception
among the "penumbras" of the bill of rights, indicates that the justices had this perception of
their role. See Schnably, supra note 4, at 862-63; see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 109 (1962) (noting that the Court must apply "society's fundamental
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should prefer a doctrine centered around love, or another normative
"good," to one that depends strictly upon form.
IV. DEFINING THE PATIENT'S DEATH
Some consider death, like family, a biological or natural fact.
Increasingly, however, death is recognized as something society
defines. The recent formulation of "brain death" in response to
advances in medical technology is one example. Less often recog-
nized is the definition of death that emerges from the struggle for con-
trol of the patient as her loved ones and the medical establishment
each seek to employ the power of the state.
Cruzan illustrates the medical establishment's potential for con-
trol over the patient's loved ones. The loved ones,2  like the members
of Nancy Cruzan's family, are emotionally and psychologically bound
to the patient. But the medical establishment effectively controls the
patient and, through the loved ones' emotional bond with the patient,
the loved ones as well. The hospital not only controls the medical
care that the patient needs, it also controls the medical knowledge
that defines that need. When the hospital tells Nancy Cruzan's father
that she has hope for recovery, and that it needs his consent to treat
her, he naturally signs the form.210 But ultimately Nancy does not
recover, and her loved ones conclude that issues are no longer medi-
cal-that is, beyond their control-but familial.2 1  The hospital
administration refuses to terminate treatment without a court order,
and conflict ensues.21 2 At this point the parties enter a less structured
realm of behavior in which they struggle for control.
Exercising what Foucault has called "bio-power," the state allo-
principles"). To be sure, there are troubling implications for a democratic government when
the ostensibly "least dangerous branch" of unelected officials announces our central values.
See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST chs. 2-3 (1980) (criticizing
constitutional interpretivism and the implausibility of realizing "fundamental" values). Even
when courts avoid or reject such a role, however, inevitably they shape our values. See supra
notes 169-72 (noting the normative effects of court decisions about the family). Since laws do
order our preferences to some degree, lawmakers-including the courts--should lead in
promoting welfare and autonomy. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1172 (noting the legislatures
should pass laws, and courts should invalidate them, in order to promote autonomy).
209. Hereinafter the term "loved ones" will refer to those individuals that have established
a substantial and reciprocal emotional bond with the patient. The term is distinguishable from
"family," a group related by marriage and kinship. See supra notes 139-54 and accompanying
text (distinguishing the conventional family and loved ones).
210. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503). Both Nancy's father and her husband (later divorced) issued
authorizations. Id.
211. Id. at 8.
212. Id.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cates control and thereby constitutes the loved ones' relation to the
medical establishment, as well as to the rest of society.213 Faced with
the conflict between the medical establishment and the loved ones, the
court must ultimately empower one over the other.2 14 Either the
loved ones will control, and give death their own meaning, or the
medical establishment will control, and death will become "medical-
ized"--controlled by the medical bureaucracy and its technology. By
strictly subscribing to the medical definition of brain death, the state
initiates the medicalization of the death of the incompetent patient.
215
The patient becomes an object, supported by the gastronomic tube
and monitored by the electroencephalograph, while the loved ones
look on in submission to medical authority.216
In Cruzan, Justice Brennan correctly recognized that this "status
quo" is the result of the state empowerment of the medical establish-
ment, but nevertheless he concluded that the state can defer to the
individual in order to allow a natural result:
Artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration represents the "status
quo" only if the State has chosen to permit doctors and hospitals to
keep the patient on life-support systems over the protests of his
family or guardian. The "status quo" absent that state interference
would be the natural result of his accident or illness (and the fam-
ily's decision).217
This assertion illustrates two fallacies similar to those inherent in the
courts' treatment of family.2"8 First, the notion of "state interfer-
ence" is defective because the state cannot merely refuse to intervene.
Inevitably the courts must resolve disputes over terminating life sup-
port. Second, the patient's death is not a "natural" result, or to the
extent that it is, the distinction between nature and artifice is morally
213. As Michel Foucault notes, "[flor a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of
sovereign power was the right to decide life and death." FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY,
supra note 4, at 135. The raw exercise of power reflected by the control over death later
developed into its more subtle, modern form-"bio-power"--or the regulation of life through
the control of health care. Id. at 139-43. From a Foucauldian perspective, recent technology
that has brought about new forms of life simply highlights a power relation that has extended
throughout history.
214. See MINOW, supra note 135, at 328.
215. See Eric J. Cassell, Dying in a Technological Society, in DEATH INSIDE OUT, supra
note 83, at 43, 46-47 (describing hospital's depersonalization of dying).
216. Id.
217. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2873 n. 17 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Note the statement reveals a misconception of the power relation. The state
does not "interfere"; its role is intimately connected to the production of the medical
establishment's relation to the family. By permitting hospitals to deny the family's wishes, the
state subordinates the family. But by refusing to allow hospitals to deny the family's wishes-
what Justice Brennan might consider "nonintervention"-the state empowers the family.
218. See supra Part III.
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unimportant.21 9 We cannot simply ignore the fact that our society
has the means to support the ill.220 Beyond this, however, the passage
reveals a presumption that death is a purely biological event, when in
fact we only understand death through our society.
A. The Constitution of Death as a Medicalized Event
Death poses the unique existential dilemma. It is unique, in part,
because it is unknowable. Whether it is a transformation into noth-
ingness or immortality, the experience of death has never been
related, at least not to most. Indeed, what little we "know" consists
of beliefs that, though supported by historical evidence, cannot be
confirmed by actual experience.221 Such induction may inform us of
the nature of dying until the moment of death, but beyond that
moment, death is so alien to our experience that it can neither be
known nor understood.
222
The unknowable quality of death gives it a character that is at
once profoundly personal and utterly social. In one sense, death is
private because it cannot be shared or even known in advance. The
anxiety we each will suffer alone in the face of our unknowable fate
"must give us pause. ' 223 Yet to cope with the anxiety caused by the
unknown, societies have developed rituals that help individuals cope
with death. 224 These rituals, which are shared by those with personal
219. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 286-
89 (1976) (noting that use of description of "natural" death obscures normative issues).
220. Ignoring the ability to preserve the patient reinstates the dubious ethical distinction
between neglecting to care for a dying patient and actively removing the patient's care, or
indeed, causing the patient to die. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
221. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 60-69 (1912), reprinted in AN
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 565-69 (Joseph Margolis ed., 2d ed. 1978).
222. Upon the moment of death, an observer may still inductively draw conclusions about
non-life; for example, the dead "person" is essentially inanimate. But at this point the living
observer can no longer analogize her nature with that of the dead person, at least in any
meaningful sense. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS
482-86 (1948), reprinted in AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 117-21 (Joseph
Margolis ed., 2d ed. 1978) (describing personal knowledge through analogy). Perhaps she
could conclude, "If I were dead, I would be inanimate." However, this inference misses the
existential crux of the issue: what is the state of conscious being upon death?
223. As he grappled with the nature of death, Hamlet said,
To sleep, perchance to dream, ay there's the rub,
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
Must give us pause ....
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, il. 65-68 (John D. Wilson ed., Cambridge
University 1934). Hamlet was concerned with the nature of the afterlife that he presumed
existed, rather than the potential lack of such an afterlife. Considering what a hell afterlife
may be, even such faith did not offer adequate relief for anxiety about death.
224. See William May, The Metaphysical Plight of the Family, in DEATH INSIDE OUT,
supra note 83, at 49 (describing family's reaction to the unknowable quality of death).
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ties to the dying individual, are also profoundly influenced by social
conceptions of death. 225 A person must be free "to conform choices
about death to individual conscience, ' 226 yet the person's death has
meaning only according to "how she will be thought of after her
death by those whose opinions mattered to her. '227 The social ritual
of death, and what that ritual means to the individual, inform the
individual's freedom to define death.
Though the universal, unknowable nature of death has caused
fear throughout history, the meaning of death has changed over time
and among cultures.228 It is true, as Justice Stevens noted in Cruzan,
that recent "[medical] advances, and the reorganization of medical
care accompanying the new science and technology, have ... trans-
formed the political and social conditions of death: people are less
likely to die at home, and more likely to die in relatively public places,
such as hospitals or nursing homes. ' 229 Until the beginning of the
twentieth century, however, the death of an individual was a ritual
shared by "a social group that could be extended to include the entire
community. ' 230 Throughout the medieval and early modem period,
the community protested death's invincibility by general, public
mourning, but over the nineteenth century such mourning became
personal and, ultimately, anti-social. 23' Death became private and
shameful as the event of dying transferred from the home to the hos-
pital.232 Today death has become taboo.233 Far from naturally a pri-
vate event, death became so by our society's construction.
The present control modem medicine exerts over death, termed
the "medicalization" of death by historian Philippe Aries,234 arose
from the medical monopoly in the health care field.235 This health
225. See id. See generally ARIES, supra note 89 (describing history of death rituals).
226. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2885 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. at 2885-86.
228. See generally ARIES, supra note 89 (narrating the history of European and American
treatment of death from medieval to modem periods). For a compilation of different cultural
views on the right to die itself, as well as death, see To DIE OR NOT TO DIE?: CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE DEATH
(Arthur S. Berger & Joyce Berger eds., 1990).
229. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2883 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
230. ARIES, supra note 89, at 559.
231. See id. at 582-83.
232. See id. at 570-71, 575, 583.
233. See id. at 583.
234. Id. at 583-88.
235. Since death and health define one another, the medical establishment's control over
health encompasses death as well. See IVAN ILLICH, The Political Uses of Natural Death, in
DEATH INSIDE OUT, supra note 83, at 25.
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care monopoly originated in the years following the Civil War, with
the support of the state, through licensing requirements, increased
selectivity by medical schools, and accreditation requirements for the
schools themselves.236 True power, however, did not arise merely
from a constrained supply of trained doctors, but from a monopoly of
medical knowledge that is, from the perspective of the laity, impene-
trable.2 37 We visit the doctor not simply for treatment, but also to
learn what sickness we have, or whether we even are sick. 2 38 This
deference to the doctor, learned in childhood through the family,
239
becomes natural and forecloses the consideration of health care
alternatives.
The medicalization of death developed with modem advances in
medical technology. 24° Prior to the advent of life-support techniques,
few patients survived extended periods of deep coma.24 1 Heart func-
tion, measured initially by stethoscope and later by electrocardio-
graph, determined death.242 With advances in technology, brainstem
activity became the gauge of human existence, ranging from irrevers-
ible loss of function to normal brainstem activity.243 The irreversibly
brain-dead, whose respiration and circulation were supported wholly
by artificial means, posed a recurring dilemma.2 " Spurred by the
need for viable organs, the costs of maintaining the bodies' support,
236. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA MEDICINE 102-27
(1982); see also ELLIOT A. KRAUSE, POWER & ILLNESS 34-41 (1977) (describing domination
through expertise legitimated by licensing); JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH
254-65 (1990) (relating the fruition of the medical monopoly following World War II).
237. STARR, supra note 236, at 114; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 164, at 176 (describing
the development of "medico-administrative" knowledge).
238. See STARR, supra note 236, at 14; Alasdair MacIntyre, Medicine Aimed at the Care of
Persons Rather Than "at... ?, in CHANGING VALUES IN MEDICINE 83, 86 (J. Cassel &
Mark Siegler eds., 1979).
239. See FOUCAULT, supra note 164, at 174-75 (describing the use of the family-child
complex in the medicalization of individuals).
240. ARIES, supra note 89, at 583-88.
241. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 86, at 21 (crediting "intravenous hydration, nasogastric
feeding, bladder catheterization and respirators" as life-supporting techniques).
242. Id. at 14-15.
243. "Brain death, coma and the vegetative state differ to the extent to which there is
function of the brainstem, the part of the brain that controls unconscious activity. In brain
death, there is complete and irreversible loss of brainstem function," and organ functions can
only be maintained for a few days or weeks. Brief of the A.M.A., supra note 7, at 7-8
(footnotes omitted). Patients in a vegetative state, though oblivious to their surroundings,
maintain a relatively normal brainstem function allowing them to breathe air, digest food, and
produce urine without assistance. Id. at 8. Coma is a intermediate position rarely lasting more
than two to four weeks, following which the patient either dies, enters a vegetative state or
regains some degree of consciousness. Id. at 9.
244. A President's Commission study of four acute care centers found that two-to-four
cases of irreversible loss of brain functions occurred each month. DEFINING DEATH, supra
note 86, at 22.
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and the suffering of the patients' families, the medical community
reformed its definition of death to include the complete loss of brain
function.245 Following the medical community's lead, a group of rep-
resentatives from the American Bar Association, the American Medi-
cal Association, and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws created the Uniform Determination of Death
Act, which defines death by the irreversible cessation of either circula-
tion and respiration or all functions of the entire brain.2 "
Significantly, the distinction between "brain death" and "heart
death" is cast as a matter of medical observation and diagnosis. Such
diagnosis allows the medical establishment nearly total control over
the patient.247 Moreover, the very definition of death remains subject
to change with further discoveries in the medical field. In the process,
the medical establishment aspires to complete control over the mea-
surement of human existence. Intuitions of what constitutes life and
death, and the attributes we consider central to humanity, assume a
secondary role at best. Ultimately, loved ones must appeal to the
standards of medical technology. 248 The result is the phenomenon of
245. See id. at 23-24; see also Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition ofIrreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968) (formalizing the definition of irreversible coma). Medicine's division of the death of the
human being into "heart death" and "brain death" is widely criticized, much for the same
reason that we question the "life" of Nancy Cruzan: it is possible for a person to have a
functioning lower brain, and so not qualify as brain dead, even after the person has lost all
possibility of ever regaining consciousness. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text
(describing Nancy Cruzan's "life" in the persistently vegetative state). '
246. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 338-39 (Supp. 1991)
(describing the history of the Act); DEFINING DEATH, supra note 86, at 73. The court in
Cruzan found that under such a statute Nancy was living; it cited Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005
(1986), which provides:
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of human death shall be determined in
accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless the
following minimal conditions have been met:
(1) When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained, there is
an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation; or
(2) When respiration and circulation are maintained, and there is total and
irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the brain stem and that such
determination is made by a licensed physician. *
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 n.1 (1990).
247. See Dena S. Davis, Slim Just Left Town: Decisionmaking on an Intensive Care Unit, 23
CONN. L. REV. 261, 269 (1991) ("The reason power remains with the physicians is that all of
these [medical] approaches are, and in the nature of things must be, dependent on the medical
prognosis.").
248. The medical measurement of death is important in light of the rising number of
persons dying in hospitals and thus susceptible to life-sustaining treatment. See ROBERT
VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 4 (1976) (deaths occurring in
U.S. hospitals rose from 37% in 1937 to 61% in 1958).
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death as we know it today, in which the individual, often isolated and
helpless, is left to the control of medicine.
The medicalization of death takes over the lives of the patient
and her loved ones. A vegetative patient, or any patient forced to
accept life-sustaining medical treatment, continues to live against her
will where she would not want to persist in such a fashion. The
patient's loved ones, in turn, suffer a more subtle injury. Their emo-
tional attachment to the patient demands that they preserve the
patient's personhood, a burden that requires appealing to the medical
establishment and, if need be, the courts. This burden is so substan-
tial that, to a great extent, the medicalization of the patient's death
determines the course of the loved ones' lives.
As Cruzan illustrates, the medicalization of death injures the
patient and her loved ones by stripping the patient of her personhood.
Medicalization depersonalizes the patient by dominating the patient's
existence with medical procedures. 24 9 A dying person is both an indi-
vidual with a uniquely human personality and a physiology that is
functioning inadequately.25° To investigate the patient's physiology
effectively, medicine "depersonalizes" the patient by focusing on the
faulty bodily process to the exclusion of the individual's per-
sonhood.25' Such depersonalization also stems from the growing cor-
porate bureaucracy of health care252 and the tendency of doctors to
demand every possible treatment to forestall death.253
The patient's loved ones, meanwhile, must suffer by witnessing
the degradation of the patient's individuality. As Cruzan illustrates,
the loved ones suffer both from their own denial of the fundamental
249. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (describing the extent to which medical
procedures dominated the existence of Nancy Cruzan).
250. Cassell, supra note 215, at 46.
251. Id. To the extent that clinical medicine is an "applied" science and not a "pure" one,
however, the abstraction of the body into separate mechanisms is by no means complete.
Ernan McMullin, Clinical Medicine as a Science: A Commentary on Eric Cassell, in
CHANGING VALUES IN MEDICINE, supra note 238, at 167.
252. To maximize profits, medical care has grown in scope and scale into multihospital
corporate bureaucracies. See STARR, supra note 236, at 428-36 (describing the evolution of
incorporated medicine). Individualized care is lost in such a bureaucracy: the patient is the
sum of the entries on her forms and records, seen by different physicians at different times, left
to wait, and entirely dependent on the expertise the organization controls. MacIntyre, supra
note 238, at 83-89. Potential legal liability can figure more prominently into decisionmaking
than the personal values of the patient, as the Cruzan case itself illustrated. There the trial
judge described the medical institution's chief concern as "the legal consequences of such
actions rather than any objections that good ethical standards of the profession would be
breached." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 433 (Mo. 1988) (Higgins, J., dissenting).
253. LARRY R. CHURCHILL, RATIONING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 9 (1987) (discussing
physicians' "maximalist" ethic, a philosophy analogous to the sanctity of life). The maximalist
ethic is also promoted by "physician insecurity and patient anxiety." Id.
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change in the patient's state of being, as well as from their conviction
that the patient herself would refuse to remain in such a state.254 The
slow decay of the patient's physical being serves as a continual wake,
denying her loved ones the emotional healing that accompanies burial
and bereavement. 255
The loved one's helplessness in the wake of the hospital's control
compounds their anguish. One mother whose child was born after
only twenty-seven weeks of pregnancy and hemorrhaging into his
brain and lungs witnessed "a roomful of doctors around this tiny
baby, trying to resuscitate him. '25 6 When the doctors were finished
and the mother questioned their aggressive treatment of the infant,
one of them angrily replied: "'You don't make those decisions. We
do.' "27 Hospitals exert such control not only to preserve patients
whom they deem alive, but also to terminate patients whom they con-
sider suffering and incapable of recovery.258
Despite the family's emotional suffering and subjugation, the
Court's right to die discourse considers the family to have no rights
independent of the incompetent patient. 25 9 The lack of an independ-
254. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (describing the emotional trauma
experienced by the Cruzan family).
255. Bereavement is a social and psychological process of detachment, transition, and
return to society. See William May, Attitudes Toward the Newly Dead, in DEATH INSIDE
OUT, supra note 83, at 139, 145; see also Alan Stoudemire & J. Trig Brown, Delayed and
Distorted Grief- Pathological Patterns of Bereavement, 26 TRAUMA 5 (Dec. 1984) (unresolved
bereavement can lead to pathological grief). Justice Brennan also noted that "[a] long drawn
out death can have a debilitating effect on family members." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2869 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Nancy Cruzan's father
said, "Nancy's gone.... I've accepted that. But when this is over and she formally dies, then
we can get into the formal grieving." Malcolm, supra note 15, at 24L.
256. Gina Kolata, Parents of Tiny Infants Find Care Choices Are Not Theirs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1991, at Al.
257. Id.
258. For example, an Atlanta court recently refused permission to remove life support for a
13-year old girl where the hospital considered its own treatment to have become "abusive and
inhumane." Ronald Smothers, Altlanta Court Bars Efforts to End Life Support for Stricken
Girl, 13, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at AI0. Although following the hospital's discussions
with her, the girl's mother agreed to cease the support, her father believed that a miracle would
come to save his daughter. Id. The court ruled in the father's favor, finding that there was no
clear evidence of "medical abuse"; thus, "if either parent, in the exercise of his or her rights
with regard to the welfare of Jane Doe, makes the decision to continue Jane Doe's life, as the
father has in this case, that decision must be respected." Id. The girl died eight days after the
ruling. Ronald Smothers, Ailing Girl at Center of Fight Over Life Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1991, at A6; see also Doctors Assert Patient's Right to Die, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1991, at 26
(trial court enjoined hospital from removing support where loved ones refused to give up hope
for patient diagnosed as persistently vegetative); Husband Wins Right-to-Live Case, MIAMI
HERALD, July 2, 1991, at 6A.
259. The right to die is based upon a person's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. The
family cannot exercise the right on behalf of their relative in the absence of proof that their
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ent right arises in part from liberalism's tendency to view even the
incompetent person as an autonomous, self-determinative individ-
ual.2s6 Under this framework, the Court did not believe that "the
Due Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on these
matters with anyone but the patient herself." '261 In fact, the family
is suspect as a substitute decisionmaker precisely because of its close-
ness with the patient. The very closeness that may justify substituted
judgment could deny an objective evaluation of the patient's
circumstances. 262
Neither of these aspects of the right to die explains the courts'
refusal as a matter of law to consider the emotional and psychological
burdens of family members.26 3 Courts may consider the emotional
costs to the family,2 6 or deny termination of treatment without fam-
views reflect those of the relative. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2855 (1990); see also supra note 40.
260. Cf. Rosa Eckstein, Comment, Towards a Communitarian Theory of Responsibility:
Bearing the Burden for the Unintended, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 845-48 (1991) (criticizing
applications of liberalism in the context of institutions); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 175-83 (1982) (arguing that because society at least partially
constitutes character, individual and community interests may coincide). The mission of this
Comment's analysis of family is, in a sense, to define the individual's "community." See id. at
173 ("[C]ommunity must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants
and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the
participant's plans of life.").
261. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1990).
262. See id. at 2855-56 (noting close family members may have "a strong feeling" that is
"not at all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested either"); see also Minow, supra
note 26, at 974-76 (contending that closeness of family to the patient may taint objectivity).
263. The court indeed noted that the Cruzans are "loving and caring" but did not
recognize, legally or otherwise, the cost of that love in enduring their daughter's fate. See
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
264. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ill. 1989) ("The slow,
deliberate nature of the court system may frustrate the family and loved ones of the patient.").
A dissent in the Missouri Supreme Court keenly empathized:
The principal opinion attempts to establish absolutes, but does so at the expense
of human factors. In doing so it unnecessarily subjects Nancy and those close to
her to continuous torture which no family should endure. I am grasping for
words which elude me, and so will not say more.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 430 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., dissenting). The dissents
in the United States Supreme Court were sensitive to the issue as well. Justice Brennan noted
that "[a] long, drawn-out death can have a debilitating effect on family members." Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens essentially argued that the family's
interest should be honored through the patient, as a derivative right:
Each of us has an interest in the kind of memories that will survive after death.
To that end, individual decisions are often motivated by their impact on others.
A member of the kind of family identified in the trial court's findings of this case
would likely have not only a normal interest in minimizing the burden that her
own illness imposes on others, but also an interest in having their memories of
her filled predominantly with thoughts about her past vitality rather than her
current condition.
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ily approval,2 65 but currently they do not recognize the loved ones'
emotional suffering as an independent criterion for the removal of
treatment. However, the judicial analysis of state interests does typi-
cally include "the protection of the interests of innocent third par-
ties."'2 66 The courts use this factor to consider emotional and financial
damage resulting from the death of a patient, especially with respect
to minor children.2 67 The calculus could also include the emotional
damage to the patient's loved ones by not terminating treatment, but
courts are currently unwilling to recognize this kind of harm.
The failure to recognize the family's independent interest in the
treatment of the patient is significant because, beyond the patient her-
self, the family has the most at stake in the dispute. The family is,
after all, still conscious, and it is typically the impetus for removal of
life support. But the true source of a loving family's interest is its
emotional bond with the patient. Faced with the loss of the person
they knew, family members are denied relief from their sorrow, a
relief that the patient herself would have wanted them to have.
Instead, the family is helpless, and forced to witness their loved one
slowly decay.
Siding with the medical establishment, the state extends the
loved ones' trauma by placing them in a subservient role in right to
die litigation. State interests weighed against the right to terminate
treatment also include the protection of medical ethics.26 Nothing in
the legal nature of the physician-patient relationship justifies weighing
the medical profession's interests against the patient's. 269 By support-
ing the presumption that death is a purely biological event, the state
nevertheless places control of the patient in the hands of the medical
establishment and constitutes the loved ones' subordinated role. Just
as the state uses the family to classify and disempower individuals, it
classifies the patient as "living" according to the medical establish-
ment's definition, thereby placing the patient in the hospital's control.
If the hospital refuses to abide by treatment directives, the patient's
loved ones must petition the court to change the status quo.27°
Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (N.J. 1985) (requiring approval of kin under
tests not based entirely on the patient's wishes).
266 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977)).
267. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
268. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2848.
269. See Ben A. Rich, The Assault on Privacy in Healthcare Decisionmaking, 68 DENY. U.
L. REV. 1, 4-10, 15-17 (1991).
270. See Rhoden, supra note 24, at 429-32 (noting that the courts do not question medical
intervention and instead burden the family to change the status quo).
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B. Death De-Medicalized
Because death is not a timeless, biological event, but a socially
constructed phenomenon, it should not be defined by a single stan-
dard, at least in the patient-hospital relationship.27' Instead, courts
should allow the individual to define death within bounds set by the
norms of society. Moreover, we should seek to empower individuals
and their loved ones against the tendency of the state and the medical
establishment to dictate the constitution of death, allowing people the
widest potential for self-determination.
Death need not be the medicalized event that it has become.
Rather than shrouding death in medical technology and bureaucracy,
courts should permit people to retain a sense of dignity by allowing
patients a degree of control over the manner in which they die.
Courts should empower loved ones to decide the patient's treatment,
leaving doctors with an advisory role.272 Rather than burdening the
loved ones with the often impossible task of proving what the patient
would have wanted, the presumption would lie in the favor of the
loved ones. 273 The physicians' drive to preserve life, coupled with
their right to petition the court for the appointment of a guardian,
would help prevent potential abuses by the family.274 But even sub-
ject to that check, the shift of power to the loved ones in the first
instance would help prevent them from being relegated to a
subordinate role.
The exact degree of latitude that loved ones should have in
directing the patient's treatment is difficult to quantify. They should
have the greatest freedom where a patient, like Nancy Cruzan, has
irrecoverably lost all consciousness; arguably, the patient does not fit
the general conception of human life. Precisely because the aim is to
empower the loved ones, however, they should have similar latitude
when religious or moral beliefs compel them to seek to continue life
support for a patient whom the hospital considers dead. 275 Despite
271. This does not mean, however, that a certain biological event should not be used to
determine other legal relationships, such as life insurance contracts, wills, etc.
272. See Rhoden, supra note 24, at 439-45 (advocating relegating doctors to an advisory
role). The medical community's liability should diminish, however, to the extent that its
control diminishes and the patient's liberty expands. See Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257
(Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that patient's estate must share liability for patient's death where
the physician causes a life-threatening injury and the patient refuses medical care for religious
reasons).
273. Rhoden, supra note 24, at 441.
274. Id.
275. See Alvarado v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 547 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1989) (Jehovah's Witness parents disputed hospital's determination of infant's death), order
vacated, Alvarado v. City of New York, 550 N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 1990).
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the medical definition of death, some religions such as Orthodox
Judaism consider life to have ended only when the heart stops func-
tioning and thus would not consider a patient to be "dead" if brain
functions alone had ceased.27 6 The devotion of the patient's loved
ones in such instances should outweigh the hospital's desire to termi-
nate treatment, even in a case where medical prognosis is poor.
2 77
When the patient stands within the threshold of consciousness,
more difficult qualitative choices arise, and the danger of euthanasia
emphasized by proponents of the sanctity of life argument becomes
real. Opponents of euthanasia reject the termination of life support
out of fear that the patient may have chosen to remain alive. But the
idea of absolute respect for the wishes of a competent person regard-
ing treatment when she becomes incompetent is untenable because the
incompetent patient herself may not have adequately conceived of her
fate.278 Indeed, in this respect, even living wills are flawed. To be
sure, they should not be cast away lightly, because the very act of
signing a written document may occasion greater reflection than
would an off-handed remark to a friend. To question the extent to
which we remain the same persons over time is not to assert that the
incompetent individual is an entirely different person from her former
self.279 Rather, the person's prior directives reflect the values of the
patient-values which should be a compelling, albeit rebuttable, fac-
tor in evaluating present desires.28 0
The freedom to die necessarily permits death choices that can be
poorly motivated. People who had never considered advance direc-
tives will do so upon realizing that they have such liberty.281 How-
ever, their new preferences will continue to reflect limitations upon
their ability to choose, typically imposed by ignorance. McKay v.
Bergstedt,282 a case decided after Cruzan, illustrates this problem.
276. Charlotte K. Goldberg, Choosing Life After Death: Respecting Religious Beliefs and
Moral Convictions in Near Death Decisions, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1197, 1214-15 (1988) (brain
death definition is rejected by Orthodox Jews and certain Native Americans and Japanese).
Others might refuse the brain-death definition to oppose active euthanasia or harvesting of
organs. Id. at 1216-17.
277. See supra note 258.
278. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
279. Rhoden, supra note 24, at 415 (criticizing "insisting on viewing a person only in a
highly restricted slice of time").
280. Id.
281. A person's preferences adapt to choices of which she is conscious. When the
evolutions of the law reveal a new form of liberty, such as the freedom to die, the person
restructures her preferences around opportunities previously foreclosed from her
contemplation. See supra note 205 (discussing Professor Sunstein's theory of "adaptive
preferences").
282. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
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Kenneth Bergstedt, a thirty-one year-old quadriplegic, sought
removal of his life-supporting respirator. 2 3 Bergstedt did not have a
terminal illness, and he found distraction in reading, writing poetry,
and watching television.284 However, he relied upon others entirely.
Faced with the imminent death of his last surviving parent, "Kenneth
was plagued by a sense of foreboding concerning the quality of his life
without his father."'285 Despite realizing that "Kenneth's suffering
resulted more from his fear of the unknown than any source of physi-
cal pain," '286 the Nevada Supreme Court sanctioned the termination
of his life-support. "Given the circumstances under which he labored
to survive, we could not substitute our own judgment for Kenneth's
when assessing the quality of his life."
'2 7
Ironically, the court's substitution of its judgment is most defen-
sible when a patient's decisionmaking is distorted by such despon-
dency. The dissent noted that the court did not adequately resolve
"whether [Bergstedt's] decision to take his own life was completely
rational or possibly a product of some kind of clinically identifiable
depression. 2 8 There may have been little attempt to convince Berg-
stedt that life was worthwhile. 28 9 Although Bergstedt surely under-
stood the meaning of life as an invalid, he could not conceive of such a
life without the loved ones that had supported him.29° Rather than
allowing him to make such an "autonomous" judgment about the
quality of his life, the court should have demanded that the judgment
be a truly informed one.
The Bergstedt case reflects the potential harm of unenlightened
life-and-death decisionmaking. Consider the situation of a lone, eld-
erly person contemplating the possibility of becoming incompetent.
Prior to the establishment of the right to die, the person may not have
even considered a death directive. But now she does, and perhaps
more out of fear of becoming a burden than of truly desiring not to be
placed on life support, the person elects to die. In this setting the
283. Id. at 620.
284. Id. at 624.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 624-25.
288. Id. at 637 (Springer, J., dissenting). The dissent, also troubled by the lack of adversity
in the case, believed that "there was no real case or controversy before the district court." Id.
at 632; see also id. at 634 n.6 (noting that the only argument favoring life instead of death was
presented by an amicus brief rejected by the court because of its late filing).
289. Id. at 637 ("Mr. Bergstadt was completely lacking in positive support... all input was
one-sided, all death and no life.").
290. Interestingly, the only argument in the case in favor of preserving Bergstedt's life was
made by general counsel for the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled, a group that perhaps could best conceive of Bergstedt's fate. See id. at 634 n.6.
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court must evaluate the situation of the decisionmaker, and the con-
text of the decision, to be sure that the choice is an informed, rational
one. To the extent that it avoids ill-conceived directions, such an
evaluation justifies the somewhat paternalistic, idealized standard of
best interests.29'
When the patient is still capable of consciousness-"alive" in the
intuitive sense-quality of life judgments must consider life from the
patient's circumstances to whatever extent possible.2 92  Although
decisionmakers will be able to identify with the patient, no one will be
able to view life directly from the patient's perspective or transcend
personal values.2 93 Such an approach, however, does not automati-
cally assume fantastic "Alice in Wonderland" proportions, 294 but sim-
ply attempts to more sensitively judge the situation.2 9 In such cases,
the doctor's understanding of the patient's perceptions and desires has
its greatest importance.296 Ideally, the incompetent patient's treat-
ment decision will arise from a dialogue between the doctors and the
loved ones, marked by shared information and mutual care for the
patient.297 Without such a relationship, the loved ones risk making an
erroneous decision, fashioned perhaps not from an improper motiva-
tion but out of the inability to empathize with the patient's position.
Although the presumption of correctness should still lie with the deci-
sion of loved ones, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem in
each instance where such dialogue does not occur.
Moreover, in determining the parameters of the freedom to die,
society should not conceive of life and death as opposite, exclusive
states but rather as poles at the ends of the spectrum of existence.
These poles are the forms of existence that nearly all of us understand
to be life and death: the healthy, thinking, emotional, social interac-
tive person and the utterly unconscious, circulation-less corpse.298 In
between are gradations of existence, with varying degrees of mental
291. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1171 (noting that paternalism may be justified where
subjectively perceived interests arise from distortions).
292. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-32
(Mass. 1977).
293. See MINOW, supra note 135, at 335.
294. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 15-11, at 1369 (criticizing Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
295. See MINOW, supra note 135, at 322.
296. See Dresser, supra note 52, at 391-93 (advocating new methods of understanding the
patient's perspective).
297. See Fentimann, supra note 20, at 840-48 (proposing conversation in decisionmaking).
298. The person defined in this manner is more than a mechanism; activities central to
personhood such as reasoning and feeling are equally as important. See DEFINING DEATH,
supra note 86, at 38-40 (discussing "higher brain" formulations of death). The common
understanding of life consists of more than its physical aspects. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
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and physiological well-being: poor health, incompetence, terminal ill-
ness, coma, persistent vegetation, lack of independent circulation, and
cessation of all brain activity. At each pole, society demands particu-
lar behavior without questioning the deeper meanings of life and
death. At some point, however, society permits the affirmative act of
modifying the existence from one form to another: often our society
permits causing a persistently vegetative person to become brain-
dead.
One alternative to today's medical definition of death, further
towards the middle of the spectrum, focuses on "neocortical death,"
or the irreversible loss of consciousness and cognitive activity.
Neocortical death consists of the irreversible cessation of activity in
specific areas of the brain that govern awareness of the self and the
environment, whereas "brain death" requires the cessation of all brain
activity.299 A neocortical definition of death seems preferable to a
whole-brain basis of death because the higher function of the brain-
human consciousness-seems to be the sine qua non of humanity."a°
The definition is also a single, recognizable phenomenon, and there-
fore an adequate standard.3"1
Another alternative conception of death, further towards the
intuitive standard for life, is the irreversible loss of the capacity for
interpersonal relationships.3 a 2 Advances in artificial intelligence indi-
cate that, rather than consciousness, such interpersonal relationships
distinguish us as human.03 Unlike neocortical death, the capacity for
of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J, dissenting) ("Life, particularly human life, is not
commonly thought of as a mere physiological condition or function.").
299. See Raymond J. Devettere, Neocortical Death and Human Death, 18 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 96 (1990).
300. A neocortical definition of death centers on the irreversible loss of "the capacity to
think, feel, communicate, or experience our environment" that is "the key to human life."
David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 860
(1986). Neocortical death can be diagnosed by Positron Emission Tomography ("PET")
scanning, which, though expensive, is relatively cheap when compared with costs maintaining
a neocortically dead patient. Id. at 878-883. Critics of neocortical death argue that public
policy demands retaining the "old" definition of death, which itself is misunderstood and
morally objectionable to many. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 86, at 58-59; Devettere,
supra note 299, at 102. In light of the importance of death to self-determination, the socially
understood meaning of death as loss of consciousness rather than electrical activity to the
brain, and the ability to judicially construct exceptions to the definition of neocortical death
much as to the present exceptions to brain death, arguments that the redefinition will create
"confusion" or "resistance" by the society are questionable.
301. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 86, at 57-61 (outlining policy objectives for the
definition of death).
302. See Kevin P. Quinn, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for
Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REV. 897 (1988).
303. See Steve Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and
Nancy Cruzan, 34 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991).
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interpersonal relationships is free from the control of medical technol-
ogy. But the standard is based upon the presumption that capacity
for interpersonal relationships is essential to the incompetent patient's
personhood; such a qualitative judgment, made from the perspective
of a now-and-always competent person, is problematic. 304 The inter-
personal relationship standard also neglects the practical necessity of
a definite baseline for evaluating life and death.
Wherever it is fixed, the baseline of death should reflect the val-
ues of society as a whole, rather than those of the medical establish-
ment or the government alone. Treating death as a matter of purely
medical definition perpetuates the conception that life ends only when
electrical impulses in the brain permanently cease. Society holds life
sacred, but life's sanctity does not arise from electrical impulses alone.
In protecting sacred life through the medical definition of death,
courts and legislatures needlessly injure people who do not hold scien-
tific beliefs. People may not know that the persistently vegetative
patient has lost consciousness forever, and they may believe the
patient's twitches and noises prove she is alive. Until we become
aware of what the "life" of the persistently vegetative patient is, and
the capability of medical technology to ascertain life and death
through different criteria, we can never be free to give life and death
meaning according to our own values.3a 5
In sum, this model of treatment decisionmaking requires a stan-
dard of death that reflects societal values, and a hierarchy of decision-
making, giving priority to the patient's values, related by her loved
ones. The different levels in the hierarchy would be (1) the patient's
prior directives made while competent; (2) the loved ones' decision;
and (3) the decision of the physicians or guardian ad litem. Lower
priority decisionmakers could rebut the higher ones by adequately
proving that the decision arises from a mistaken view of reality.
The aim of the analysis is not to ensure absolute respect for the
patient's autonomous choices. Much of what constitutes each per-
son's value system is socially constructed. a° If our values are formed
to some extent by the society with which we share our lives, then the
304. See Dresser, supra note 52, at 379-81 (noting that transformation to an incompetent
state can radically change a person's interests). But see Rhoden, supra note 24, at 414-19
(critiquing Dresser and advocating using the incompetent patient's past values for evaluating
present interests).
305. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1147, 1154-55 (discussing distorted preferences arising
from relations of power and the possibility of reconstructing preferences).
306. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 764-70 (finding self-definition is based upon definition
in relation to others); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1170-71 (noting that, because desires are
socially constructed, autonomy is a matter of degree).
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issue of what we would want becomes, to some extent, the issue of
from whom our values are formed. By establishing those persons
with whom the patient has bound herself emotionally, the court can
establish the patient's values. The issue of familial abuse, though still
a possibility, is greatly diminished; those who are emotionally bound
to the patient, rather than bound simply economically or in some
other fashion, should not be improperly motivated. The proposed
hierarchy at least alters the existing means of choice to increase the
probability of deciding as the patient would desire, with the least
injury to the patient's loved ones.
The courts' role is limited but important. It must resolve dis-
putes where the loved ones challenge the patient's prior directive, or
the physician or guardian ad litem challenges the loved ones. The
court's role increases where the patient has no surrogate, or the
patient is born incompetent and can never choose others with whom
to associate and form values. As a preliminary matter, the court must
decide whether the condition of the patient is within the range of
human quality that will permit the removal of treatment. °7 Finally,
307. A decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware, Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108
(Del. 1991), exemplifies this method. Colin Newmark, a three-year-old, was dying of
lymphoma. Colin's doctor prescribed a radical form of radiation therapy which had only a
40% chance of success but would be painful and potentially lethal. Id. at 1111. After Colin's
parents refused the treatment for religious reasons, the Delaware Division of Child Protective
Services sued and won custody of the child in the Family Court. Id. at.1110 The Delaware
Supreme Court reversed, noting two failures in the lower court's opinion: the failure to
consider "the special importance and primacy of the familial relationship," and the failure to
consider invasiveness and ineffectiveness of the treatment. Id. at 1115.
In several respects the Newmark decision resembles the method of decisionmaking
proposed here. The court noted the patient's quality of life, recognized that quality as within
the range of quality that should permit freedom to refuse treatment, and consequently allowed
the patient's loved ones to determine treatment as they saw fit. Id. at 1120. The court
distinguished cases in which parents were not allowed to deny treatment where the side effects
were minimal or there was a significantly greater likelihood of success. See Custody of a
Minor, 379 N.E. 1053 (Mass. 1978) (child suffered no significant side effects from treatment);
In re Willman, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (amputation would save child's life).
On the other hand, the court glossed over the troubling issue of whether the family's
decision arose from its religious values rather than love for the child. The court noted "the
unquestioned close bond between Colin and his family." Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1120. The
court also criticized the family court's failure to formally analyze whether the child was
neglected. Id. at 1114. Despite this, the court did not remand for a more stringent analysis of
the parent/child relationship. The issue became moot because the child died shortly after the
court's oral decision. Id. at 1121 n.13. Nevertheless, the court's written decision, handed
down several months later, is replete with formalistic family-rights discourse. Id. at 1115-16
("the essential element of preserving the integrity of the family is maintaining the autonomy of
the parent-child relationship"). Compare supra Part III.A. (critiquing formalistic analysis of
family rights). The implication of such family-rights discourse is that the values of the parent
and child coincide; considering that the child was only three years old, doubtless he had little
opportunity to consider his own choices rationally.
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and perhaps most important, courts must decide who are the "loved
ones."
V. CONCLUSION
Society determines death and family. The way in which society
fashions those concepts dictates the manner and extent of an individ-
ual's freedom to define herself in relation to them. For the Cruzan
family, death empowered the medical establishment and threatened to
render them helpless. In a similar way, family at least initially
empowered Sharon Kowalski's father and excluded her loved one,
Karen Thompson. These uses of death and family are offensive
because their precepts-the physiological basis of death and the kin-
ship basis of family-are often out of synch with more fundamental
social values. The concepts are malformed to the extent that a human
is not human without consciousness, though the brain sparks and the
heart beats, and a family is not family without love, though as kin
they share one blood.
Death is personal. Each person has an exceptional liberty inter-
est in the way she dies. Those who are emotionally bound to the one
who is dying also have an interest in the manner in which she dies.
Present approaches to the termination of life-supporting treatment
either ignore or subordinate the emotional harm that occurs to the
patient's loved ones, the very class of persons that the patient herself
would want to protect. It may not be desirable or even possible for
the patient and the patient's loved ones to have nearly absolute free-
dom to decide how she will die; the order that society demands can-
not and would not permit each individual to formulate death in his or
her own way.
Our society only permits ordered liberty-the freedom to act
within a socially defined structure of behavior. All aspects of that
structure-even the seemingly necessary ones like family and death-
are subject to transformation. Considering not only the patient's
autonomy and values as overall guides, but also the effect on the
patient's loved ones, we can reconceive death decisionmaking. But by
adopting policies based upon an assumed but unexamined cultural
meaning, we irreparably harm the relationships we value most in our
society.
T.A. TUCKER RONZETTI
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